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ABSTRACT

Moreno Sanchez, Pedro PhD, Purdue University, August 2018. Credit Network
Payment Systems: Security, Privacy and Decentralization. Major Professor: Aniket
Kate.
A credit network models transitive trust between users and enables transactions
between arbitrary pairs of users. With their ﬂexible design and robustness against
intrusions, credit networks form the basis of Sybil-tolerant social networks, spamresistant communication protocols, and payment settlement systems. For instance,
the Ripple credit network is used today by various banks worldwide as their backbone
for cross-currency transactions. Open credit networks, however, expose users’ credit
links as well as the transaction volumes to the public. This raises a signiﬁcant privacy
concern, which has largely been ignored by the research on credit networks so far.
In this state of aﬀairs, this dissertation makes the following contributions. First,
we perform a thorough study of the Ripple network that analyzes and characterizes
its security and privacy issues. Second, we deﬁne a formal model for the security
and privacy notions of interest in a credit network. This model lays the foundations
for secure and privacy-preserving credit networks. Third, we build PathShuﬄe, the
ﬁrst protocol for atomic and anonymous transactions in credit networks that is fully
compatible with the currently deployed Ripple and Stellar credit networks. Finally,
we build SilentWhispers, the ﬁrst provably secure and privacy-preserving transaction
protocol for decentralized credit networks. SilentWhispers can be used to simulate
Ripple transactions while preserving the expected security and privacy guarantees.

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Credit networks [1–3] model transitive trust among users through pairwise credit
allocations. A credit network user expresses trust on another user in the form of
a credit value that she is willing to extend to the other user, and by indicating
commitments to allow transactions across her diﬀerent credit links. This enables
that the credit network users perform transactions over paths consisting of several
intermediate users. Moreover, by introducing suitable deﬁnitions of transaction, credit
networks have been shown useful in a plethora of scenarios. In fact, sybil-tolerant and
spam-resistant systems based on the concept of credit network have been proposed in
the last few years, such as Bazaar [4] and Ostra [5]. Prominently, credit networks are
also leveraged in two growing payment settlement systems: Ripple [6] and Stellar [7].
The Ripple Network The Ripple network has seen a widespread adoption as an
interesting alternative to avoid large fees charged by intermediate banks today while
performing world-wide transactions. The Kansas-based CBW Bank and Cross River
Bank [8], the Royal Bank of Canada [9] or Santander [10] are a few examples of
banks using the Ripple network after exploring the numerous available blockchain
options [11–14]. Companies are also using advantages of Ripple (e.g., fast and low-cost
international transactions) to build better cross-border payment services. For example,
Earthport [15, 16] has adopted Ripple to perform transactions between banks over
several countries over the world, while Saldo.mx uses the Ripple network to improve
cross-border transactions between USA and Mexico [17]. Moreover, Microsoft has
partnered with Ripple to use part of its Azure BaaS to contribute to the execution of
the Ripple network [18].

2
1.1

Challenges in Credit Networks

The Privacy Challenge Most of the credit network designs proposed so far (e.g.,
Bazaar and Ostra) are centralized, i.e., the credit network is maintained entirely in
a server environment. The others, such as Ripple and Stellar, make their entire sets
of transactions as well as the credit network topology visible in a publicly available
log (i.e., the blockchain) to establish credibility through transparency. As a result,
credit networks today cannot provide any meaningful privacy guarantee. This state
of aﬀairs clearly conﬂicts with the desire of users, who instead strive for hiding their
credit links and their transactions: Businesses and customers are interested in hiding
their credit information and transactions from competitors and even service providers,
while regular users aim to protect their transactions as they might reveal personal
information (e.g., medical bills or salary).
Designing a privacy-preserving solution for credit networks is technically challenging.
Simple anonymization methods such as the pseudonyms employed in Ripple are
ineﬀective, as all transactions remain linkable to each other and they are susceptible to
deanonymization attacks [19]. Other techniques proposed in academia [20–23] do not
fully solve the problem either. For instance, providing the server environment only with
the topological network graph while keeping credit values private opens the system
up to correlation attacks that ultimately reveal the partners’ real identities [20, 21].
Perturbing the links or their credit values by means of diﬀerential privacy techniques [22,
23] would yield stronger privacy guarantees, but this is often unacceptable in payment
scenarios as it implies unexpected redistributions of credit.
The Decentralization Challenge A natural direction to overcome the privacy
challenge consists in envisioning a decentralized credit network, where each user locally
stores and maintains her own credit links. A decentralized credit network design ﬁts
better the nature of certain applications such as the current ﬁnancial ecosystem, where
each user is responsible for her own credit while each ﬁnancial institution is responsible
for the credit with its customers. However, building a decentralized credit network
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is not straightforward. There are several credit network operations that are trivially
solved in a centralized setting but become challenging in a decentralized design.
For instance, while a centralized service provider can easily determine a transaction
path between two users, it is not trivial to deﬁne how the routing information is
spread along a decentralized credit network. Similarly, a decentralized setting requires
ﬁnding out how much credit is available on the paths between any two users to
perform transactions. Finally, a decentralized setting requires a solution to ensure the
correctness of the transactions, while maintaining the credit balances of honest users
in the presence of malicious and oﬄine users.
The Security Challenge Designing a secure solution for credit networks becomes
challenging in a decentralized setting, where every user maintains her own credit links
and relies on other users to carry out her transactions, some of which may behave
arbitrarily. For instance, a transaction over a path can be easily disrupted by a
malicious intermediate user aiming at a credit beneﬁt or by a (possibly honest) user
that simply goes oﬄine. Such behavior can lead to credit losses by honest users as
well as severely hamper the availability of the overall credit network. A decentralized
credit network must thus ensure atomic payments so that every credit link in a path
is correctly updated to carry out a successful transaction or no credit link is modiﬁed
otherwise. A decentralized credit network should ensure thereby that no honest user
incurs credit loss.

1.2

Our Contributions
This dissertation focusses on demonstrating the following statement:
Current credit network deployments provide limited guarantees in terms
of security, privacy or decentralization. It is possible to build a secure,
privacy-preserving and decentralized credit network system.
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In the following, we brieﬂy describe our contributions to demonstrate the veracity
of this statement.
A Security and Privacy Study of the Ripple Network In Chapter 2, we
present the ﬁrst thorough study that analyzes the globally visible blockchain in the
Ripple network and characterizes the security and privacy issues related to it. In
particular, we have extensively studied the eﬀect of unexpected redistribution of
credit, the eﬀect of faulty gateways and the eﬀect of stale oﬀers and shown their
consequences in terms of credit loss by Ripple users. Regarding privacy, we deﬁne
two novel heuristics and perform clustering to group wallets owned by the same user.
We then propose reidentiﬁcation mechanisms to deanonymize the operators of those
clusters and show how to reconstruct the ﬁnancial activities of deanonymized wallets.
Security and Privacy Deﬁnitions for Credit Networks In Chapter 3, we lay
the foundations for security and privacy in credit networks, presenting a deﬁnitional
framework. In particular, we formalize the notions of integrity, value privacy and
sender/receiver privacy. Intuitively, we say that a credit network maintains integrity if
no honest user loses credit when cooperating as intermediate user in a payment path.
Moreover, we say that a credit network maintains value privacy if the adversary cannot
determine the value of a transaction between two non-compromised users. Finally, we
say that a credit network maintains sender (correspondingly receiver) privacy if the
adversary cannot determine the actual sender (receiver) of a transaction.
PathShuﬄe: Anonymous Transactions in the Ripple Network In Chapter 4,
we present PathShuﬄe, the ﬁrst privacy-enhancing protocol compatible with the Ripple
network. As its essential building block, we propose a novel technique to perform
atomic transactions in credit networks and extend it to build a decentralized protocol
for anonymous transactions. We demonstrate the practicality of PathShuﬄe by
executing an instance of the protocol in the current Ripple network. This protocol
thereby provides a functionality otherwise missing in the current Ripple network.
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SilentWhispers: A Decentralized Architecture to Enforce Security and
Privacy in Credit Networks In Chapter 5, we present SilentWhispers, the ﬁrst
decentralized and provably secure and privacy-preserving transaction protocol for
credit networks. Partial solutions like PathShuﬄe are an interesting approach for
raising the privacy bar in the currently deployed Ripple network. However, the
distinguishing feature of SilentWhispers is the assurance of strong security and privacy
guarantees in credit networks without requiring a global, transparent and publicly
accessible blockchain. SilentWhispers can be used to simulate the Ripple transactions
in real time and therefore can be deployed as an online credit network.

1.3

Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized in two parts. Part I includes our study and deﬁ-

nitional work on security and privacy for credit networks and comprises Chapter 2
and Chapter 3. In particular, in Chapter 2 we describe the background on the Ripple
network and our security and privacy study of the Ripple network; and in Chapter 3
we propose the security and privacy notions of interest in a credit network.
Part II focuses on the description of our novel systems that provide secure and
privacy-preserving transactions in credit networks and comprises Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5. In Chapter 4 we describe PathShuﬄe, the privacy-enhancing protocol fully
compatible with the current Ripple network. In Chapter 5 we detail SilentWhispers,
a decentralized architecture that provides strong security and privacy guarantees for
transactions in credit networks.
Finally, we summarize this dissertation in Chapter 6.

Part I
SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN
CREDIT NETWORKS: STUDY
AND DEFINITIONS

6

7

2

REAL-WORLD CASE STUDY: RIPPLE

The properties inherent to a credit network have been found of great utility in a
plethora of applications. In particular, several academic eﬀorts [4,5,24–27] have shown
that by adapting the notion of credit to the speciﬁcs of a certain application, it is
feasible to come up with a tailored credit network to enforce key functionalities for
such application. Nevertheless, none of these academic proposals have been deployed
in practice at the time of writing. Existing deployments for a credit network have
focussed so far on the settlement of payments between users. In such application,
credit between two users is deﬁned as the trust in each other in terms of the amount of
I Owe You (IOU) funds they are willing to extend to each other. Building upon this
concept of credit, a credit network can be leveraged to settle payments between any
two users improving upon many of the drawbacks of the alternative systems available
today (e.g., SWIFT) such as slowness, expensiveness and prone to thefts [28, 29].
Currently, Ripple and Stellar are the most prominent examples of credit networks
in practice. The Stellar network is still in an early but expanding stage and it has got
the support of a few ﬁnancial institutions and payment aggregators, mostly focussed
on developing countries. The Ripple network instead, has gained more traction and it
has been tested and adopted by several major banks and ﬁnancial institutions that
see in the publicly available Ripple network an alternative to improve the processing
of payments. For instance, the Spanish bank Santander has claimed that adopting
Ripple could save them $20 billion a year [10]. The Kansas-based CBW Bank and
Cross River Bank [8] are the ﬁrst American banks to adopt Ripple. The Royal Bank
of Canada [9] has chosen Ripple over other settlement solutions after exploring the
numerous available blockchain options. And these are just a few examples in a still
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growing list [11–14]. As of August 2017, the Ripple network cates a user base of more
than 180, 000 accounts, 350, 000 credit links and more than 29M transactions during
the period January 2013 – August 2017.
The potential of Ripple is not limited to the traditional banking system. Other
ﬁnancial institutions are also using the advantages of Ripple to build better cross-border
payment services. For example, Earthport [30] has chosen Ripple to perform crossborder transactions between more than 60 countries worldwide. Moreover, companies
such as Microsoft and universities such as MIT are using part of its computational
resources to contribute to the execution of the Ripple network [31, 32]. Given the
wider development in practice, we use the Ripple network as case study of credit
network in this dissertation. We note, however, that most of the descriptions apply
also to the Stellar network as both build upon (mostly) the same principles. In the
rest of this chapter, we overview the diﬀerent components of the Ripple network. We
then study the security and privacy of the Ripple network.

2.1

Description of the Ripple Network
The Ripple network heavily relies in three components as shown in Figure 2.1: a

credit graph, a set of operations and a consensus protocol. The credit graph reﬂects
the IOU relations among payment providers, ﬁnancial institutions and customers
among others. This ﬁnancial network is updated by means of operations that allow
to create new IOU relations, update existing ones, settle credit among any two users
or provide currency exchange services, utterly necessary for liquidity and remittance.
These transactions would be, however, useless without a way to globally agree on
their validity. The Ripple consensus protocol provides a mean to create a blockchain
that unequivocally stores the set of valid transactions, as agreed by a set of protocol
players from all around the world in a decentralized fashion. In the rest of this section,
we describe in detail each of the components separately.
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Transaction(...),
Transaction(...),
CreateLink(...), Offer(...)

}
}

Credit graph

Operations

Bob

Alice

Fig. 2.1. Illustrative example of the Ripple ecosystem. Dashed arrows
represent communication between parties. Filled arrows represent credit
links. The Ripple credit graph represents wallets and credit links among
them. The graph is updated by means of operations. The operations are
submitted by the corresponding users to the participants in the consensus
protocol. Only validated operations are added to the blockchain (or ledger
in Ripple terms).

2.1.1

Credit Graph

At the core of the Ripple network lies a weighted, directed graph G “ pV, Eq. The
set V of vertices represents the accounts (or wallets in Ripple terms) in the network,
and the set E of directed and weighted edges represents the IOU credit links between
wallets. A Ripple wallet is initialized with a pair of private (signing) and public
(veriﬁcation) keys. The wallet is then labeled with an encoding of the hashed public
key. The knowledgeable reader might have noticed that a Ripple wallet is created and
labeled similar to a cryptocurrency account such as Bitcoin.

10

Dave

Bob

0/

/-

5/-

EU

EUR

/
40
80

15

20

R

20

0U
SD

0.01 / 0.05 BTC

D

GW

0/
150

Alice

R
- EU

85

Gateway

/-

UR

EU

R

Edison

15

E
/-

Fanny

Carol

Fig. 2.2. An illustrative example of the Ripple credit graph. For readability,
every wallet is represented by a name instead of the hashed public key
used in practice. Edges represent credit links between pairs of connected
nodes. The edges are labeled with tuples (x / y XYZ ), where x denotes
the balance, y denotes the upper bound (- represents a not upper-bounded
credit link), and XYZ denotes the currency.

A directed edge (u1 , u2 ) P E is labeled with a tuple (balance, currency, upper-limit),
where balance is a dynamic scalar value αu1 u2 indicating the amount of unconsumed
credit that wallet u1 has extended to wallet u2 (i.e., u1 owes αu1 u2 to u2 ); currency
denotes the denomination for such credit. The credit available on an edge is lowerbounded by 0 and is upper-bounded by 8 by default, while a more strict upper bound
can optionally be adopted by the creditor’s wallet (i.e., u2 in the previous example)
by setting the upper-limit ﬁeld. Additionally, every wallet has associated with it a
positive amount of XRP.
Therefore, Ripple supports its own native cryptocurrency, called XRP. Contrary
to other cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, where coins are continuously
being created until a predeﬁned limit number of coins is reached, a ﬁxed amount
of XRP were initially created and no more XRP will be ever created according to
the current protocol description. The XRP currency was initially envisioned as a
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mean to protect the network from abuse and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In this
sense, the purpose of XRP is twofold. First, a wallet is considered active only if it
has a certain amount of XRP, deterring thereby the creation of a massive number of
wallets by a single user for spamming purposes. Second, each transaction requires a
certain transaction fee in XRP, hindering thereby massive spamming transactions.
Nevertheless, the ﬁnancial usefulness of XRP is yet to be thoroughly studied.
An illustrative example of the Ripple network is shown in Figure 2.2. Here, consider
that Alice and Bob are two users in the Ripple network. Further consider that Alice
owes Bob 150 USD. This illustrative example is reﬂected in the Ripple network as one
edge Alice Ñ Bob with a balance of 150 USD. Note that the balance on an edge is
tagged with the corresponding currency, as well as the upper bound. In this case, Bob
allows Alice to owe him up to 200 USD. This value eﬀectively limits the trust that
Bob has on Alice. The rest of credit links can be interpreted in a similar manner.
In summary, the Ripple credit graph is a directed graph where credit links expressed
in many diﬀerent currencies coexist. It provides enough expressiveness to emulate the
complex relations among the diﬀerent players in a plethora of ﬁnancial applications.

2.1.2

Key Roles

The Ripple network heavily relies on two roles played by some of the wallets:
gateway and market maker. A gateway is a well-known reputed wallet established to
create and maintain a credit link in a correct manner with new users. Gateways are
therefore the counterparts of user-facing banks and loan agencies in the physical world.
As an illustrative example, consider a new user that wants to join for the ﬁrst time the
Ripple network. For that, she would need to create a fresh wallet, create a new credit
link and get some balance on it from another wallet in the system. This is known as
bootstrapping problem and it is a common problem in many networks such as social
networks or communication networks. The Ripple network solves this bootstrapping
problem by introducing gateways. Therefore, the user can trust the gateway to create
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a credit link and issue her ﬁrst IOUs on such link. As wallets for gateways are highly
connected wallets in the Ripple network, the thereby created credit link will allow the
new wallet to interact with the rest of the Ripple network.
A market maker is a wallet that has credit links with balance denominated in
more than one currency and performs a currency exchange service, that is, it receives
a certain currency on one of its credit links and exchanges it for another currency
on another of its credit links. Market makers are therefore the counterparts of
physical currency exchange services. For instance, in the illustrative example depicted
in Figure 2.2, Bob can act as a market maker by accepting the exchange among USD,
BTC and GWD currencies. The role of market makers is crucial to provide liquidity
and enable cross-currency transactions in the Ripple network.

2.1.3

Operations

The Ripple network graph is updated by means of operations. For the ease of
exposition, we classify these operations in two groups: single-wallet and multi-wallet
operations. In a nutshell, single-wallet operations update a single wallet and the
credit links associated to it in the Ripple network. Single-wallet operations represent
the counterpart of bank account management operations in the real world. Instead,
multi-wallet operations may update several wallets and credit links among them to
eﬀectively represent the settlement of funds among wallets in the Ripple network.
The Ripple network supports several single-wallet operations. First, the AccountSet
operation allows a user to update a wallet she possesses. Second, OﬀerCreate enables
the creation of an exchange oﬀer. An additional OﬀerCancel operation can be used
to cancel a previously created oﬀer. Finally, TrustSet operation allows the creation of
a credit link between two wallets if such credit link does not exist yet, or the update
of a credit link in case it already exists. For the sake of brevity, we omit a detailed
description of these operations and refer the reader to [33] for further details.
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Table 2.1.
Ripple transaction examples for both direct XRP payments and path-based
settlement transactions. In the direct XRP payment, 20 XRP are sent
from Alice to Bob. In the settlement transaction, 10 EUR are transferred
from Dave to Edison via Gateway. The notation Alice denotes the Ripple
wallet owned by Alice. Irrelevant transaction ﬁelds have been omitted.

Sender

XRP Payment

Path-based Settlement Transactions

Alice

Dave

Receiver

Bob

Edison

Amount

20 XRP

10 EUR

Path

–

Dave Ð Gateway Ñ Edison

SigningPubKey

Alice’s public key

Dave’s public key

Tx Signature

752EF7 . . .3402D1

42EF56 . . .34DDFF

The core activity in the Ripple network centers around multi-wallet operations.
As described earlier in this chapter, a wallet ui can hold two types of funds: XRP
coins and IOU credit issued by other wallets in the Ripple network connected to ui
through a direct link. As they are conceptually diﬀerent, the Ripple network handles
them by two types of operations: direct XRP payments and path-based settlement
transactions. Intuitively, a direct payment involves a transfer of XRP between two
wallets which may not have a credit path between them. Path-based settlement
transactions transfer IOUs deﬁned in any currency (ﬁat currencies, cryptocurrencies
and user-deﬁned currencies) between two wallets having a suitable set of credit paths
between them.
We now describe both types of payments by an illustrative example. We start
with direct XRP payments. Assume that a wallet u1 wants to pay β XRP to another
wallet u2 and that u1 has at least β XRP in its XRP balance. Then, β XRP are
removed from u1 ’s XRP balance and added to u2 ’s XRP balance. For example, in the
transaction showed in Table 2.1, 20 XRP are about to be transferred from Alice to Bob.
Given that Alice’s XRP balance is high enough, 20 XRP are taken from Alice’s XRP
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balance and added to Bob’s XRP balance. Notice that this type of transaction does
not require the existence of any (direct or indirect) credit line between the sender and
the receiver. Therefore, the Path ﬁeld of the transaction is not used.
Path-based settlement transactions totally depart from direct payments as they use
the credit links available in the Ripple network. Assume that u1 wants to pay β IOUs
to un and that u1 and un are connected by a path of the form u1 ´ u2 , . . . , un´1 ´ un .
Edges are considered undirected to ﬁnd a path from the sender u1 to the receiver un
through intermediaries tui uiPt2,...,n´1u . In order to perform the transaction, the weight
(i.e., credit value) on every edge in the path from u1 to un is updated depending on the
direction of the edge as follows: edges in the direction from u1 to un are increased by β,
while reverse edges are decreased by β. For the settlement transaction to be successful,
weights must always remain non-negative and must not exceed the pre-deﬁned upper
bound of the edge (if the upper bound is other than 8).
In the settlement transaction shown in Table 2.1, assume that Dave wants to pay
10 EUR to Edison. This transaction can be routed using the path Dave Ð Gateway Ñ
Edison (see Figure 2.2). Since credit link Dave Ð Gateway holds 20 EUR (i.e., ą 10
EUR) and credit link Gateway Ñ Edison has no upper bound, the transaction can be
performed and credit links are updated as follows: link Dave Ð Gateway is decreased
to 10 EUR while link Gateway Ñ Edison is increased from 85 to 95 EUR.
It is not necessary to ﬁnd a single path with available credit along each credit link.
Instead, the settlement transaction can be split across multiple paths such that the
sum of credit available on all paths is larger than or equal to β. For example, in the
network from Figure 2.2, assume now that Dave wants to pay 25 EUR to Edison. The
settlement transaction now can be split into two settlement transactions with amounts
of 20 EUR and 5 EUR. The 20 EUR settlement transaction can be performed as
explained earlier, while the 5 EUR settlement transaction is carried out over the path
Dave Ð Fanny Ñ Edison. In Ripple, it is possible to include the information about
the several paths used in a single settlement transaction: the list of paths are included
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in the Path ﬁeld annotated with the amount of credit used per path. The Amount
ﬁeld still indicates the total amount of transacted IOUs.
Moreover, in our running example we have assumed that all the links have a
common currency. In the Ripple community, rippling denotes the redistribution of
credit for each intermediate wallet as a consequence of a transaction [34]. Rippling can
only occur between two credit links that belong to the same wallet and have credit in
the same denomination. Nevertheless, several rippling operations can be concatenated
to carry out a transaction with several intermediate wallets, as described above. We
expect that rippling is allowed by gateways; however, less active users may opt for
disabling this rippling functionality, eﬀectively avoiding undesired balance shifts.
Nevertheless, settlement transactions are not restricted to same-currency transactions. It is possible that the sender uses some of her IOU in any given currency and
the receiver receives the corresponding amount of IOU in any other currency, carrying
out thereby a cross-currency settlement transaction. Such transaction is possible only
if at least one of the intermediate wallets acts as market maker.
In summary, for completeness in this section we have described both payments
and settlement transactions. However, in the rest of this dissertation we focus on
settlement transactions as they are the only ones that transfer IOU credit among
wallets in the network. Moreover, we observe that the XRP currency might not be
required for implementing transaction fees. Instead, fees can be embedded in the IOU
settlement of the transaction itself: When a user in the path from the sender to the
receiver gets β IOU, she can forward only β ´ α IOU, eﬀectively charging α IOU as
fee. This way of handling fees comes with the advantage that every intermediate user
can charge a custom fee according to her own criteria (e.g., the transacted amount,
transacted currency or transacting users).
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2.1.4

Consensus Protocol

Inspired from the success of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, all Ripple operations
are also logged in a public available blockchain called Ripple ledger. The Ripple ledger
is thereby an immutable log that keeps track of all wallets, credit links and exchange
oﬀers in the Ripple network as well as their evolution over the Ripple timespan. The
Ripple consensus protocol is carried out by a set of (somewhat ﬁxed) participants
called validators and it is used to decide the set of operations that are added to the
Ripple ledger. In the following, we overview the Ripple consensus protocol.
An operation is authorized by the sending wallet’s owner by signing it with the
corresponding signing key. Such operation is then forwarded to a validator. Validators
are thus in charge of receiving authorized operations from users and validate their
correctness according to the current state of the ledger and the consensus rules.
Note that since diﬀerent wallet’s owners might forward their operations to diﬀerent
validators, they might end up with diﬀerent sets of operations. The consensus protocol
must then ensure that all validators agree on an unique ledger.
The consensus protocol proceeds in rounds. In the ﬁrst round, each validator
broadcasts its own candidate set of operations, that is the set of validated operations
that it has received so far and are not added to the ledger yet. Successive rounds
are used to vote a candidate ledger that contains the subset of operations from all
candidate sets that have been voted by “enough” validators. When a candidate
ledger is voted by 50%, . . . , 80% of the validators (increased by 10% per round), it
is considered ﬁnal and it is added to the Ripple ledger. The operations that do not
make it into the ledger are either discarded or added to the next protocol iteration.
Although several permissioned consensus algorithms, such as Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (BFT) consensus [35], have been throughly studied in the distributed systems
literature over the last 35 years, the Ripple consensus protocol is a novel approach
informally presented in a whitepaper [36] along with an open source implementation.
Moreover, only some preliminary analysis have been performed so far [37–40]. In
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general, the lack of formal deﬁnitions and security studies of the Ripple consensus
protocol, makes its safety and liveness analysis an interesting open problem.

2.2

Security Study
In this section, we overview the possible vulnerabilities of the Ripple network to

attacks that aﬀect the IOU credit of users’ wallets and we refer the reader to [41] for
a more detailed discussion. In particular, we ﬁnd that about 13M USD are at risk in
the current Ripple network due to inappropriate conﬁguration of the rippling ﬂag on
credit links, facilitating undesired redistribution of credit across those links. Although
the Ripple network has grown around a few highly connected hub (gateway) wallets
that constitute the core of the network and provide high liquidity to users, such a
credit link distribution results in a user base of around 112, 000 wallets that can be
ﬁnancially isolated by as few as 10 highly connected gateway wallets. Indeed, today
about 4.9M USD cannot be withdrawn by their owners from the Ripple network due to
PayRoutes, a gateway tagged as faulty by the Ripple community. Finally, we observe
that stale exchange oﬀers pose a real problem, and exchanges (market makers) have
not always been vigilant about periodically updating their exchange oﬀers according
to current real-world exchange rates. For example, stale oﬀers were used by 84 wallets
to gain more than 4.5M USD from mid-July to mid-August 2017. Our ﬁndings should
prompt the Ripple community to improve the health of the network by educating its
users on increasing their connectivity, and by appropriately maintaining the credit
limits, rippling ﬂags, and exchange oﬀers on their IOU credit links.

2.2.1

Eﬀect of Unexpected Balance Shifts

Although a settlement transaction maintains the net balance of intermediate
wallets, its use is not innocuous for intermediate wallets. The main issue is that the
market value and stability of the IOU depends on the issuer of such IOU. In our
illustrative example of the Ripple network in Figure 2.2, Edison may trust the credit
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from the gateway more than the credit from Fanny. Therefore, a transaction involving
rippling among the two corresponding credit links can induce a redistribution of IOU
from a more valuable to a less valuable issuer without the speciﬁc consent of the
involved wallet’s owner. We expect gateways to allow rippling; however, less active
users may wish to avoid balance shifts not initiated by them.
As a countermeasure, each credit link is associated with a ﬂag no ripple. When
no ripple is set, the corresponding credit link cannot be part of a rippling operation.
This ﬂag was ﬁrst added in December 2013, and was updated in March 2015 to have
a default state of “set” (i.e., no rippling allowed by default), so users could selectively
opt-out and allow rippling. Additionally, a wallet has a new ﬂag called defaultRipple
that, if set, enables rippling among all the wallet’s credit links. Gateway wallets, for
instance, follow this pattern [42].
In this state of aﬀairs, we aim to identify wallets other than gateways that allow
rippling, and to extract how much credit they put at risk doing so. For that, we
proceed as follows. First, the credit links not including no ripple ﬂag are tagged
as no ripple “ false. Second, for each wallet that has the defaultRipple ﬂag set, we
set no ripple “ false (i.e., rippling is allowed) on all its credit links. Third, we use
the no ripple ﬂag for the remainder of the links as speciﬁed in the Ripple network.
Now, we say that a wallet is prone to rippling if it has at least two credit links with
no ripple “ false (i.e., they allow rippling) and they hold credit in the same currency.
Following this methodology, we ﬁnd that more than 11, 000 wallets are prone to
rippling and are not associated with well-known gateways. Moreover, more than 13M
USD are prone to rippling, counting only the credit links that wallets prone to rippling
have directly with gateways, as they are associated with real-world deposits. This
gives a lower bound on the amount of credit at risk, and the actual value could be
higher, if we count credit at risk with wallets other than the gateways. This result
demonstrates that unexpected balance shifts in the Ripple network can still aﬀect a
signiﬁcant number of wallets, and more importantly, their credit.

19
We also observe that many wallets prone to rippling maintain credit links with a
low balance (even zero), but with upper limit set to a value larger than zero. The
gap between balance and upper limit on these credit links can be used to shift the
balances of wallets, thus increasing the risk.
As a possible countermeasure, the users have the possibility of disabling the rippling
functionality on their credit links completely. Therefore, less active users may opt
for disabling rippling among their credit links to avoid balance shifts not initiated by
them. Moreover, more active users can also opt for dynamically adjust the amount of
credit prone to rippling and add a rippling fee to it. Finally, users with credit links
holding zero balance should reduce their upper limit to eﬀectively void them.

2.2.2

Eﬀect of Faulty Gateways

The gateway wallets are highly connected wallets included in the core of the Ripple
network and signiﬁcantly contribute to the liquidity of the network. A faulty gateway
can disable rippling on most credit links of its wallet, ensuring that transactions routed
through it are no longer possible and eﬀectively freezing the balance held at credit
links of its wallet [43, 44]. This would not only severely aﬀect the liquidity of the
network, but also lead to monetary losses to the neighboring wallets, as they no longer
can use the credit issued by the compromised wallet.
Given that, we aim to study the eﬀect of faulty gateway wallets (e.g., as a result
of adversarial wallet compromise) and the resilience of the Ripple network to them.
Towards this goal, we ﬁrst select 100 candidate faulty wallets from the Ripple network
according to two diﬀerent criteria: (i) Wallets with highest degree (100-deg) and (ii)
Wallets involved in most of the transactions (100-ftx). Although other strategies to
select wallets are deﬁnitely possible, these strategies lead us to select the key players in
the current Ripple network: Gateways and market makers. Second, we assess the most
disruptive set of wallets by removing them from the Ripple network and observing
how the network connectivity is aﬀected. Figure 2.3 depicts the size of the largest
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Fig. 2.3. Size of the largest connected component after removing wallets
sorted by number of credit links (blue) and number of appearances in
transactions (purple).

connected component after removing the wallets in 100-deg and 100-ftx. Intuitively,
the smaller the component, the fewer the possible transactions, since only wallets in
the same component can transact with each other. From this experiment, we conclude
that wallets included in 100-deg have a more profound impact on the connectivity
of the Ripple network (and therefore on the transactions) than wallets included in
100-ftx. Therefore, we use 100-deg in the rest of this section.
Afterwards, we deﬁne the resilience factor (rsl-factor) as the ratio between the
component size in the most disruptive splitting of the network after removing a wallet
(i.e., splitting the network in two components of equal size) and the size of the actual
largest component after removing a wallet. Therefore, the rsl-factor can take values
in the range r0.5, 1s. Values close to 1 indicate that the network has a low resilience,
as the removal of a wallet resulted in a component with (close to) half of the wallets
of the network. Conversely, values close to 0.5 indicate that the network has a high
resilience, as the largest component after removing a wallet is (close to) the entire
graph.
We observe that the rsl-factor of the Ripple network is maintained in the range
p0.5, 0.6q after the removal of each wallet in 100-deg, demonstrating that the core of
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the Ripple network has high resilience. We conclude that we can divide the Ripple
network into: (1) A small network core of around 65, 000 wallets (36% of the total)
that includes the key wallets with high connectivity. This core is highly resilient to
the removal of highly connected wallets, and (2) A large set of around 112, 000 wallets
that can be easily disconnected from the network after removal of key wallets. Yet,
these highly vulnerable wallets have more than 42M USD of credit with the gateways,
which is at risk.
This result shows that the Ripple network still has a few wallets that are “too
big to fail.” The more centralized a credit network is, the higher the impact of a
failing well-connected wallet. This could eﬀectively be comparable to a very large
bank failing in the traditional banking world (e.g., the case of Lehman Brothers). As
a countermeasure, it is necessary for many users to increase their connectivity and
split their credit among diﬀerent credit links to avoid losses due to the failure of a
handful of wallets.

2.2.3

Eﬀect of the PayRoutes Gateway

While studying the Ripple network, we observed that the Ripple community had
reported the unresponsiveness of the company running the gateway PayRoutes when
contacted regarding the credit issued by it [45]. We also emailed them, but got no
answer at the time of this writing. In this state of aﬀairs, we study PayRoutes as an
example of a faulty gateway.
In a bit more detail, we consider two questions. First, we aim to ﬁnd the amount
of credit in the Ripple network that can only be withdrawn with the cooperation of
PayRoutes and, given the unresponsiveness of the gateway, this credit is “stuck” in
the Ripple network. Second, we study why wallets with stuck credit obtained it in the
ﬁrst place, even though PayRoutes was already reported as faulty. We describe our
methodology and results for each goal separately in the following two sections.
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Credit with PayRoutes Here, we are interested in credit links of the form PayRoutes Ñ ui where PayRoutes has disabled rippling. This implies that the credit on
these links can only be used in a withdrawal operation jointly with PayRoutes: ui sets
the credit on the link to 0 to obtain the corresponding amount in the real world from
PayRoutes. However, as PayRoutes is a faulty gateway, this operation is no longer
available and the credit is stuck. Given that, we ﬁrst address the question: how much
credit is stuck on credit links with PayRoutes?
In order to answer this question, we ﬁrst pick the credit links with PayRoutes
as counterparty and positive balance, and derive the status of their rippling ﬂag (as
described in Section 2.2.1). Then, we classify the neighbor wallets of PayRoutes into
two groups as follows. First, we identify those wallets that have a credit link with
PayRoutes for which rippling is not allowed, i.e., no ripple is set to true. We denote
this set of wallets by wallets-no-rippling. Second, we consider the set of wallets that
are not in wallets-no-rippling but yet cannot perform a transaction for an amount
equal to the balance on their credit link with PayRoutes. We denote this second set as
wallets-rippling-no-tx. As the wallets in either wallets-no-rippling or wallets-ripplingno-tx cannot transfer the (entire) credit they have on a credit link with PayRoutes
to another wallet in the Ripple network, the only way for them to get their credit
back is to contact PayRoutes in the real world and withdraw the corresponding funds.
However, as PayRoutes is unresponsive, such credit is “stuck.”
As result of this procedure, we observe that, out of the 2, 958 wallets that have
at least one credit link with PayRoutes, there exist 621 wallets in either wallets-norippling or wallets-rippling-no-tx, and therefore with stuck credit. We observe that
the stuck credit on these credit links is around 4.9M USD.
It is important to note that the PayRoutes case is not typical in the Ripple network.
There have been other gateways that have ceased their activities during the Ripple
network lifetime, but have not caused such an eﬀect. We consider DividendRippler as
an example of such a gateway. The diﬀerence from PayRoutes is that before shutting
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down, DividendRippler publicly announced it and mandated its clients to proceed to
withdraw the credit available in their credit links with DividendRippler.
We conduct the same above experiment for DividendRippler, and observe that,
although 665 wallets have credit stuck with DividendRippler, such credit accounts for
around 1, 000 USD only. This is how much DividendRippler currently owes to the rest
of wallets. This demonstrates that wallets followed the announcement of the gateway
and successfully managed to withdraw most of their credit before the gateway closed.
Obtaining Credit from PayRoutes In this part we focus on answering the
question: How did wallets with stuck credit obtain such credit in the ﬁrst place?
For that, we ﬁrst investigate how new credit links were created with PayRoutes
over the lifetime of the Ripple network. We observe a spike of 2, 527 credit links
created in October 2016 from a total of 1, 805 wallets. Out of these, 186 credit links
were created by 133 wallets and have balance stuck in PayRoutes. This implies that
21% of the wallets with stuck balance created credit links with PayRoutes during that
month. We denote these by stuck-wallets-Oct-16.
Given this unusual behavior, we study how those 133 wallets obtained credit. We
identify two possibilities: (i) A path-based transaction from another wallet in the
Ripple network; (ii) A circular transaction (i.e., sender and receiver of the transaction
are the same wallet), where a wallet pays a certain amount of XRP (or any currency
issued by a gateway other than PayRoutes) in exchange for credit issued by PayRoutes
on a credit link with it.
As a result from this study, we observe that wallets in stuck-wallets-Oct-16 do not
receive signiﬁcant credit from other wallets in the Ripple network during October
2016. In particular, we ﬁnd only three transactions with credit values of 10 USD, 100
ILS and 5 ILS. Instead, wallets in stuck-wallets-Oct-16 get their credit through circular
transactions. We ﬁnd that 51 wallets perform a total of 286 circular transactions,
where these wallets received around 12, 000 USD in exchange for approximately 300
CNY and 12, 000 XRP.

24

Table 2.2.
Summary of the exchange oﬀers between XRP and USD created in the
Ripple network during October 2016. Each row represents the combination
of all oﬀers exchanging the corresponding pair of currencies.
Pay Val

Pay Cur

Get Val

Get Curr

Ratio

1062738.51

XRP

17009.50

USD

62.48 to 1

59678.62

USD

33194.62

XRP

1.78 to 1

In essence, wallets in stuck-wallets-Oct-16 invested mostly XRP to obtain USD
from PayRoutes. We ﬁnd that the exchange rate XRP/USD in the Ripple network
was considerably “better” than in the real world at that time: In the Ripple network
at that time, a wallet could get 0.73 USD for 1 XRP on average, with a minimum of
0.14 and a maximum of 2.87 USD using stale oﬀers available in the network. However,
in the real world, one could get less than 0.01 USD for 1 XRP at the average exchange
rate at that time and up to 0.28 USD for 1 XRP, even considering the best exchange
rate over the entire Ripple network lifetime.
The results presented above describe the origin of a small fraction of the credit
stuck on credit links with PayRoutes. We repeated the same experiment over the
complete Ripple network lifetime and observed similar patterns. First, the credit links
with stuck credit are involved in a total of 278 transactions where other wallets in the
Ripple network are sending credit to victim wallets at a favorable rate: The receiver
gets more credit than actually sent by the sender. Those transactions account for
around 158, 000 USD. Second, the highest amount of credit is received as a result of
circular transactions that use advantageous oﬀers. In particular, we ﬁnd that credit
links with stuck credit are involved in a total of 16, 469 transactions where they gained
more than 63M USD over the complete Ripple network lifetime.
Although wallets with stuck credit at PayRoutes obtained considerable revenue, a
broader perspective reveals that it was a risky operation. For instance, as a possible
countermeasure to this issue it is possible to check the exchange rates available in the
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Ripple network at October 2016 to determine how likely it is to get the USD credit
back. In particular, we observe that although wallets in stuck-wallets-Oct-16 managed
to get “cheap” USD, the market values were not favorable to get them back: New
exchange oﬀers created in the Ripple network in October 2016 (as shown in Table 2.2)
demonstrate this.

2.2.4

Eﬀect of Stale Oﬀers

Exchange oﬀers and rippling are the key operations that enable path-based transactions. The previous two sections investigated the security of rippling, so we now
investigate the safety of exchange oﬀers, which are set by the owners of wallets at their
own discretion. Naturally, proposed oﬀers should match those of the corresponding
currencies in the real world or even be in favor of market makers so that they get
credit for their exchange services. Otherwise, cunning users can leverage stale oﬀers
to gain credit, while market makers may go bankrupt. This would adversely impact
the liquidity and availability of the Ripple network.
In this state of aﬀairs, we aim to determine whether there are stale oﬀers in the
Ripple network and, if so, study to what extent devilry users have taken advantage
of them. Here, we consider the coin market capitalization (https://coinmarketcap.
com/) as representative source to know the prices for cryptocurrencies outside the
Ripple network. In order to achieve our goal, we ﬁrst search for sudden changes in the
currency’s market capitalization. We observed several such changes. We ﬁrst examine
a spike in the price of XRP in late 2013: During a period of ten days (Nov 20th–30th,
2013), the price of 1 XRP with respect to BTC increased by 380%, i.e., 1 XRP was
exchanged at 0.00001 BTC at the beginning of the period but within a week, 1 XRP
was exchanged at 0.000038 BTC. Given that, we extract all the transactions that
occurred during this ten-day period, obtaining a total of 1, 932 transactions. We prune
this dataset by considering only cross-currency transactions that exchange XRP for
BTC or vice versa. We obtain a total of 112 transactions.
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Fig. 2.4. Illustrative example of exchange oﬀers in the Ripple network.
Market maker accepts XRP and pays BTC (top); market maker accepts
BTC and pays XRP (bottom). If the purple point (oﬀer in Ripple) is
below the green point (oﬀer in real world), the transacting user gained
credit. Otherwise, the market maker gained credit. These transactions
took place between November 20th and 30th, 2013.

We compare the exchange rate between XRP and BTC used in each transaction
to the exchange rate in the real world at the same time, as shown in Figure 2.4. In
both ﬁgures, a purple point represents the exchange rate in a Ripple transaction while
the corresponding green point denotes the exchange rate in the real world at the same
time. For both graphs, if the purple point is higher than the green point (Ripple’s
oﬀer is more expensive than the real world oﬀer), the market maker made money. In
contrast, if the purple point is below the green point, the user who conducted the
transaction gained credit.
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We analyzed the transactions in which a sender gained credit by exploiting stale
oﬀers. We make two observations. First, users could have gained up to around 250, 000
USD by fully exploiting XRP/BTC stale oﬀers during the speciﬁed period. In other
words, market makers put at risk around 250, 000 USD due to stale oﬀers. Second,
24 diﬀerent wallets made a monetary beneﬁt of at least 7, 500 USD by exploiting
XRP/BTC stale oﬀers (and other oﬀers available in the network at that time). Here,
we calculate the USD value by converting the BTC and XRP to their real world
exchange rates at the corresponding times. In summary, even in the nascent stages
of the Ripple network, when the transaction volume was considerably low, market
makers risked signiﬁcant loss of credit by letting exchange oﬀers become stale.
To conﬁrm these results, we explored another, more recent, substantial change in a
currency exchange rate. We found a sudden increase in the price of BTC compared to
XRP in 2017, concretely during the period July 16th – August 16th: The value of 1
BTC went from 11, 713 XRP to 25, 735 XRP, that is, an increase of 120%. As before,
we extracted the transactions during that period of time and compared the exchange
rates of XRP from/to BTC in the Ripple network and in the real world. We observe
that market makers put at risk around 500, 000 USD due to stale oﬀers exchanging
XRP to BTC and vice versa. Moreover, we observe that 84 wallets exploited these
stale oﬀers (and possibly other oﬀers) to gain more than 4.5M USD. These results
conﬁrm that stale oﬀers continue to be a risk for market makers. In fact, the eﬀect of
stale oﬀers is now ampliﬁed given the growth of the Ripple network and transactions.
As a possible countermeasure to this problem, a market maker can update a
previously oﬀered exchange rate at any time. Therefore, a market maker should
continuously monitor the price for the currencies involved in its oﬀers and promptly
update its exchange oﬀers in the Ripple network when a sudden change occurs in the
real world. The gaps between exchange rates in the Ripple network and real world
are thereby reduced, and with them, the windows for cunning users to gain credit.
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2.3

Privacy Study
The Ripple ledger serves as a unique and append-only log that keeps track of all

wallets in the Ripple network, credit links between them and all valid operations that
ever happened in the Ripple network. Remember that a wallet in Ripple is represented
by the hash of the corresponding public key that eﬀectively serves as a pseudonym
for the wallet. Therefore, although pseudonyms are not directly tied to real world
identities, it is possible to reconstruct the complete ﬁnancial activity performed by a
single pseudonym. Although several research works have shown privacy breaches in
Bitcoin due to the use of pseudonyms in the blockchain [46–52], the important issue of
privacy in credit networks has not been thoroughly studied yet. This state of aﬀairs
leaves open important questions such as Is privacy a real problem in Ripple? Can we
measure it?
In this section, we overview our study of the Ripple network that sheds light to
these questions [19]. In particular, we propose two heuristics based on observations of
the interactions between Ripple wallets themselves and interactions of these wallets
with online exchange services to deposit and withdraw cryptocurrencies in and from the
Ripple network. By doing so, we show that it is possible to cluster wallets that belong
to the same user across diﬀerent systems (not only Ripple but also cryptocurrencies).
Additionally, we propose deanonymization mechanisms to reveal the identity behind
the clustered wallets. These results show the privacy breaches inherent to a publicly
available ledger, a practice followed by other credit networks as well such as Stellar.

2.3.1

Heuristic 1: Interledger Linkability

Our ﬁrst heuristic can be illustrated with the tale of two logs, as shown in Figure 2.5.
Assume that Alice has certain bitcoins in her Bitcoin wallet. Using the Bitcoin system,
she can only pay for services that accept payments in BTC. However, she cannot pay
to Bob as he only accepts payments in USD. In this state of aﬀairs, Alice can instead
transfer these bitcoins into the Ripple network, getting thereby the corresponding
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Fig. 2.5. The tale of two logs. Alice cannot pay bitcoins to Bob as he
only accepts USD (top-left). Out of her 6 bitcoins, Alice pays 2 bitcoins
to a gateway in the Bitcoin network and keeps the other 4 bitcoins for
her (top-right). Alice gets the corresponding 2 BTC from the gateway in
the Ripple network (bottom-left). Finally, Alice performs a cross-currency
transaction to settle her debt with Bob (bottom-right).

amount of BTC IOU. For that, she needs to interact with a gateway that provides
the service of exchange funds among the two networks. In particular, Alice can pay to
the gateway in bitcoins within the Bitcoin network. The gateway in turn pays back to
Alice the corresponding BTC IOU in the Ripple network. Now, she is able to pay to
Bob as the Ripple network allows the exchange from BTC IOU into USD using the
currency exchanges oﬀered by market makers (Carol in this example).
There are several gateways (e.g., Bitstamp and GateHub) which oﬀers users the
possibility to transfer bitcoins (or any of the altcoins) into the Ripple network and vice
versa. As mentioned before, Alice can pay the gateway a certain amount of bitcoins.
The gateway, upon reception of the bitcoins, issues the corresponding BTC IOU to the
credit link that Alice has previously formed with the gateway. We call this transaction
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deposit transaction. On the other hand, Alice could send (part of) her BTC IOU to
the gateway which in turn, transfers back the corresponding amount of bitcoins to the
Alice’s Bitcoin wallet. We call this transaction withdrawal transaction.
The key observation here with respect to privacy is that the a priory independent
payments carried out during deposit and withdrawal transactions are logged in the
corresponding ledgers and can be linked together following the aforementioned mechanics. For instance, in the example depicted in Figure 2.5, the payment from Alice
to the gateway (top-right) is logged in the Bitcoin blockchain while the issue of credit
from the gateway to Alice (bottom-left) is logged in the Ripple ledger. Although
Alice must use diﬀerent wallets in Bitcoin and Ripple, the fact that both logs are
publicly available allows an observer to link both operations together and in turn
determine Alice’s wallets in both systems. As the reader can imagine, this process
can be extended to link wallets that belong to the gateway as well as to extract other
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies (i.e., altcoins) wallets that can further be linked.
Heuristic 1 [Deposit and withdrawal at the gateway] The heuristic for deposit
operations to link Bitcoin and Ripple wallets belonging to the same user involves the
following steps:
1. Assume wg is a Ripple wallet owned by the gateway. Extract the set of all
transactions in the Ripple network where wg is the sender. We denote this set
by Ts pwg q. Moreover, for every transaction t P Ts pwg q, obtain the corresponding
Bitcoin transaction.We denote the corresponding Bitcoin transaction by tb .
2. For every transaction t P Ts pwg q create a pair (wg , rcvptb q), where rcvptb q is the
receiver of the Bitcoin transaction tb corresponding to t. All these pairs thereby
created correspond to Ripple, Bitcoin wallets belonging to the gateway. On the
other hand, for every transaction t P Ts pwg q, create a pair (rcvptq, sdrptb q),
where rcvptq denotes the receiver wallet of the Ripple transaction t and sdrptb q
denotes the sender wallet of the corresponding Bitcoin transaction. The two
wallets of such a pair are owned by the same user.
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The heuristic for withdrawals to link together Bitcoin and Ripple wallets belonging
to the same user involves the following steps:
1. Assume that wg1 is a Ripple wallet owned by the gateway. Extract the set of all
transactions in the Ripple network where wg1 is the receiver. We denote this set
by Tr pwg1 q. Moreover, for every transaction t1 P Tr pwg1 q, obtain the corresponding
Bitcoin transaction, which we denote by t1b .
2. For every transaction t1 P Tr pwg1 q create a pair (wg1 , sdrpt1b q), where sdrpt1b q is the
sender of the Bitcoin transaction t1b corresponding to t1 . All these pairs thereby
created correspond to Ripple, Bitcoin wallets belonging to the gateway. On the
other hand, for every transaction t1 P Tr pwg1 q, create a pair (sdrpt1 q, rcvpt1b q),
where sdrpt1 q denotes the sender wallet of the Ripple transaction t1 and rcvpt1b q
denotes the receiver wallet of the corresponding Bitcoin transaction. The two
wallets contained in such a pair are owned by the same user.
Figure 2.6 (top) shows an illustrative example for a deposit transaction. Assume
Alice wants to get 2 BTC IOU into her Ripple wallet Alice1 . To achieve that, she ﬁrst
creates a Bitcoin transaction where she transfers 2 BTC from her Bitcoin wallet AliceB1
to the gateway’s Bitcoin wallet GwB1 . Once the gateway has checked the validity of the
Bitcoin transaction, it creates a Ripple settlement transaction where it issues 2 BTC
IOU from its Ripple wallet Gw1 to Alice’s Ripple wallet Alice1 . This implies that
AliceB1 and Alice1 are owned by Alice while GwB1 and Gw1 are owned by the gateway.
Moreover, following the heuristics regarding Bitcoin change addresses proposed by
Meiklejohn et al [47], we can infer that AliceB2 also belongs to Alice.
Figure 2.6 (bottom) shows a withdrawal transaction. Assume Alice wants to
withdraw 1 BTC IOU from the Ripple network into her Bitcoin wallet. For that,
she ﬁrst sends 1 BTC IOU from her Ripple wallet Alice2 to the gateway’s Ripple
wallet Gw2 . Once the gateway has received the BTC IOU, it transfers 1 BTC from
its Bitcoin wallet GwB2 to Alice’s Bitcoin wallet AliceB3 . The withdrawal implies that
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Fig. 2.6. An illustrative example of deposit and withdrawal processes in
a gateway. For a deposit, ﬁrst Alice sends 2 BTC to the gateway and
then, the gateway sends 2 BTC IOU in the Ripple network to Alice. For a
withdrawal, ﬁrst Alice sends 1 BTC IOU to the gateway within the Ripple
network and then the gateway sends 1 BTC back to Alice in Bitcoin.

AliceB3 and Alice2 are owned by Alice while GwB2 and Gw2 are owned by the gateway.
Moreover, as mentioned before, we can infer that GwB3 belongs to the gateway.
We tested the Heuristic 1 in the gateway DividendRippler. Although this gateway
is not currently active, at the time of our experiment it was one of the most active
gateways in terms of deposit and withdrawals of cryptocurrencies from and to the
Ripple network. We limit our description to how we have extracted the necessary
information for the steps deﬁned in Heuristic 1 for the deposit process (i.e., steps 1-2).
The heuristic for the withdrawal process has been implemented in a similar manner.
1. The DividendRippler wallet (i.e., wg ) is publicly available at its website. The
set Ts pwg q has been obtained from our crawled Ripple transactions.
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2. Every deposit has its own page in the DividendRippler’s website. This page
details both the Bitcoin (correspondingly the Altcoin) and the Ripple transaction
involved. Therefore, the tb corresponding to every transaction t P Ts pwg q can be
obtained from it. Later in this section, we discuss how to generalize this step
to get the Bitcoin transaction corresponding to a Ripple settlement transaction
even if the gateway does not publicly show it.
3. For every transaction t P Ts pwg q, sdrptq and rcvptq have been obtained from our
Ripple database. The transaction t’s webpage also contains a link to the Bitcoin
(correspondingly the altcoin) block where the corresponding tb is stored. From
this block, we have obtained the ﬁelds sdrptb q and rcvptb q.
Our heuristic ﬁnds out a total of 435 Ripple wallets involved in trading with the
gateway DividendRippler. Moreover, we have been able to extract 3,145 Bitcoin
wallets and 1,173 altcoin wallets divided into 841 Litecoin wallets, 178 Terracoin
wallets and 154 Namecoin wallets.
This heuristic impacts the privacy provided by Ripple. In particular, this heuristic
enlarges the set of wallets among diﬀerent cryptocurrencies that can be linked to
a given user. This fact has several privacy implications. First, it paves the way to
reconstruct the business of a company in a more accurate manner. It is interesting to
note that since a business must publicly announce at least one wallet to its customers,
the complete (and possible large) set of wallets linked to it are deanonymized. Second,
larger sets of linked wallets among diﬀerent systems aﬀect also the privacy of users.
For instance, even if a given user has private wallets in Bitcoin (e.g., she always uses
mixing techniques for her transactions), deanonymizing one of her Ripple wallets
directly deanonymizes her Bitcoin wallets as well.
Although in this experiment we use a gateway that publishes the Ripple and
Bitcoin transactions involved in deposits and withdrawals, our heuristics are also
applicable to gateways not publishing this information. In such case, it is possible
to collect the Ripple transactions performed by the gateway and link them with
high probability to Bitcoin transactions issued in a similar time and transacting the
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corresponding amount of bitcoins. This approach leads, however, to a probabilistic
guarantee on accuracy and might include false positives in the results. Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, our heuristic enables to link not only Ripple and Bitcoin wallets,
but also wallets corresponding to other transaction networks (e.g., Stellar) and other
cryptocurrencies (e.g., Litecoin, Namecoin or Terracoin).

2.3.2

Heuristic 2: Hot-cold Wallets Linkability

The concept of hot-cold wallet is associated to a behavior that many of us have in
our daily life. Instead of carrying all of her funds in her pocket wallet, Alice carries
only part of it and spends it on her daily purchases. If she runs out of cash in her
pocket wallet, she goes to her bank and withdraws more funds to top-oﬀ her wallet.
This behavior is also present in the interactions between wallets in the Ripple network,
a fact that we leverage in our novel heuristic to link Ripple wallets controlled by the
same user.
In a nutshell, users willing to use the Ripple network to attract new business must
publicly announce (at least) one of their wallets (i.e., issuing wallet) so that future
clients can create credit link with those. For example, gateways publicly advertise
their issuing Ripple wallet in their websites. Then, the issuing wallet’s owner can issue
credit to the clients through the newly created links. However, this practice has two
main drawbacks.
First, the issuing wallet becomes an attractive target for an attacker: if the secret
key of such wallet gets compromised, the attacker can freely issue an amount of
unauthorized IOUs bounded only by the upper bound on these wallet’s links. This
problem is even more prominent given that upper bounds in the links are set to 8 by
default unless the user changes them. Such an attack has already been observed in the
Ripple network and the stolen wallet’s owner has gone bankrupt. Second, as the Ripple
ledger is publicly available, announcing ownership of a wallet and using it to carry
out all the settlement transactions clearly leads to privacy leaks: everybody can track
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the settlement transactions of the issuing wallet and reconstruct the complete activity
of the given user. Nevertheless, current businesses (such as banks and gateways) seek
to maintain privacy of their activities while using the Ripple network.
In order to overcome these issues, Ripple deﬁnes the hot-cold wallet security
mechanism to issue IOUs of any currency [53, 54]. The cold wallet is publicly linked
to a certain user. However, actual issuing of the IOUs in a credit link extended to the
cold wallet is performed by the hot wallet as follows. First, the hot wallet creates a
credit link with the cold wallet. Then, when the owner of the cold wallet must extend
credit to a user, she uses the hot wallet to extend that credit, using for this settlement
transaction the existing path (hot wallet) Ð (cold wallet) Ñ (user wallet).
The hot wallet is therefore considered to be online as it is used for daily settlement
transactions. For example, the secret key of the hot wallet might be used by a web
application to automatically perform settlement transactions to other users when
requested. When the credit link between the hot and cold wallet runs out of IOUs,
the cold wallet extends extra IOUs. This operation happens, however, less often and
can be performed oﬄine (e.g., signing locally the necessary transaction). Thus, the
cold wallet is considered oﬄine.
Following this mechanism, if the thief steals the private key of the hot wallet, he
can issue a number of unauthorized IOUs bounded by the IOUs extended from the
cold wallet to the hot wallet. Two observations are important here. First, this bound
is normally notably smaller than the bound on the number of IOUs a cold wallet can
issue. Second, the maximum number of IOUs in the link between hot and cold wallet
is totally controlled by the owner of the cold wallet. She, however, does not have any
control over the upper bound with the credit links created with the rest of the users.
With respect to privacy, we note that a settlement transaction from the hot wallet
to any other user’s wallet has the same path structure as a settlement transaction
between any two users (i.e., (sender wallet) Ð (cold wallet) Ñ . . . Ñ (receiver wallet)).
Thus, in principle, settlement transactions from the hot wallet to any user cannot
be directly linked to cold wallet’s owner. However, we observe that implementing
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the hot-cold wallet mechanism forces the user to use her Ripple wallets following
a pattern that makes it possible to link her wallets together. Intuitively, ﬁrst our
heuristic detects the possible cold wallets. Then, it checks settlement transactions
where the cold wallet is the sender. The receivers of these transactions are the possible
hot wallets. Finally, our heuristic links together hot and cold wallets that belong to
the same user.
Heuristic 2 [Hot and cold wallets ] The heuristic to link hot and cold wallets belonging
to the same user involves the following steps:
1. Extract the wallets that only have outgoing credit links in the Ripple network.
They form the initial set of potential cold wallets and we denote it by CW .
Among the wallets connected to a cold wallet in CW , those that have being paid
at least once by such cold wallet are potential hot wallets, which we denote by
HW . The rest of the connected wallets (say, a set HW ) are discarded as they
are wallets from users other than cold wallet’s owner.
2. Reduce the set of potential hot wallets HW to those that are paying to other
wallets connected to the cold wallet (i.e., the set HW Y HW ). Let HW 1 be the
thereby reduced set of potential hot wallets. Discarded wallets in this step (i.e.,
HW - HW 1 ) are added to HW , obtaining the set HW 1 .
This step intuitively ensures that potential hot wallets are being used to issue
IOU to other wallets.
3. Reduce the set of potential cold wallets CW to those that have less potential hot
wallets than discarded hot wallets. In other words, for each cold wallet cwi P CW ,
accept cwi only if |HW 1 pcwi q| ă |HW 1 pcwi q|. Let CW 1 be the thereby reduced
set of cold wallets. This step ensures there are indeed many wallets demanding
IOUs, which are then supplied using a few hot wallets.
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4. For each cold wallet cwi P CW 1 , create pairs (cwi , hwj ) for each hot wallet
hwj P HW 1 pcwi q. Here, each pair of wallets thereby created belongs to the same
user.
Figure 2.7 depicts an illustrative example of Heuristic 2. The wallet Carol1 is the
cold wallet of Carol as it does not have any incoming link in the Ripple network. In
other words, the cold wallet can issue IOUs to other wallets in the network, but no
other wallet can issue IOUs to it.
Carol uses her cold wallet (Carol1 ) to fund her hot wallet (Carol2 ) with 80 and 70
credits in two settlement transactions, while no other wallet is paid by the cold wallet.
Then, Carol2 is used to issue credit to wallets that have extended a credit line with
the cold wallet Carol1 , in this example Alice, Bob and Dave. Interestingly, although
Bob transfers credit to Alice, it is not linked to Carol given that Bob does not receive
any settlement transaction from Carol’s cold wallet Carol1 .
Our heuristic can thereby derive the fact that Carol1 and Carol2 belong to the
same user (i.e., Carol), even though settlement transactions from Carol2 to other users
follow the same path structure as transactions among other users (e.g., settlement
transaction from Bob to Alice).
We aim to devise the eﬀect of our heuristic in terms of privacy breaches when
applied to the Ripple network. For that, we run the Heuristic 2 to link wallets that
belong to the same user. Our algorithm results in 261 cold wallets, 268 hot wallets,
having a total of 529 Ripple wallets that have been clustered. Although the results of
this heuristic in practice has resulted in a low percentage of clustered wallets, they
cover a large number of settlement transactions as we show in Section 2.3.3.
The hot-cold wallet mechanism is a rather recent addition to the Ripple network,
and it is not yet extensively applied by the Ripple users. Therefore, it is important to
avoid false positives while applying this heuristic. In the following, we describe our
mechanism to handle false positives.
During our process to handle false positives we apply the principle of being as
strict as possible in order to reduce the number of them. Moreover, from our results
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we observe that false positives fall into two categories: wallets that do not follow the
hot-cold wallet mechanism yet and wallets that follow such mechanism but have used
the cold wallet to make sporadic payments to wallets other than the hot wallets. We
perform the following steps to detect false positives.
First, we calculate the distribution of settlement transactions from cold wallets to
potential hot wallets. In the absence of signiﬁcant ground truth data, we use three
gateways (Bitstamp, RippleFox and SnapSwap) well known in the Ripple community
for using the hot-cold wallet mechanism, to bootstrap a minimal ground truth for
the settlement transaction distributions. Their settlement transaction distributions
resemble the Poisson distribution with parameter λ “ 1. We then compute the
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divergence of each distribution and the Poisson distribution to detect falsely tagged
cold wallets.
In detail, we calculate the statistical distance between two distributions using the
Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence [55] as a measure. Then, we ﬂag a cold wallet as
false positive if its settlement transaction distribution diverges from Poisson more than
a threshold T . We set up T as the maximum divergence value between our ground
truth distributions and Poisson with λ “ 1.
This mechanism has ﬂagged as false positives those cold wallets that do not follow
the hot-cold wallet mechanism. In such case, the cold wallet is used to transfer IOUs
to many other wallets with a somewhat equal probability, thus having a diversion from
Poisson greater than T . We believe that these gateways’ behavior is transient and
that eventually they will correctly apply the hot-cold security mechanism. Otherwise,
as it has happened already, they risk huge losses and the possibility of even going out
of business in case their wallet’s key is stolen.
In addition, we observe some wallets following the hot-cold mechanism sporadically
paying other wallets other than the hot wallets. We conjecture that these cases represent anomalous settlement transactions. A reason for having anomalous transactions
is that, in early stages, users employ the hot-cold wallet mechanism in a non-consistent
manner. However, we expect that over the period they will start using this hot-cold
wallet mechanism correctly and in a consistent manner; otherwise, they may risk
huge credit losses and even bankruptcy as it has been already observed in the Ripple
network. Moreover, for known gateways using the hot-cold wallet mechanism, we have
observed that percentage of anomalous transactions is fairly small. In order to ﬂag
these anomalous cases as false positives, we rely on the fact that cold wallet must
refund the hot wallet repeatedly over time.
In detail, we consider 3 months (i.e., an economic quarter) as a time frame. Then,
only potential hot wallets that are refunded by the cold wallet at least once per quarter
for a period of at least two quarters are ﬂagged as real hot wallets. The rest are ﬂagged
as false positives. There is a tradeoﬀ choosing these thresholds. First, enforcing a
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less frequent refund or a shorter time frame would tag less wallets as false positives,
decreasing thus the accuracy of the approach. Enforcing that hot wallets are refunded
periodically from when they are created until today would tag real hot wallets as false
positives, reducing also the accuracy: Ripple developers suggest to have several hot
wallets [53], so that some cold wallets use one hot wallet for a period of time and then
change to another hot wallet. Moreover, thresholds for this criteria have been selected
following our design principle of being as strict as possible considering the fact that
there are path-based settlement transactions in Ripple only for less than 2 years.
Finally, we study the impact of this heuristic in the privacy guarantees of the
Ripple network. The hot-cold wallet mechanism has been proposed by Ripple aiming
at disassociating settlement transactions from hot wallet and cold wallet so that
privacy for cold wallet’s owner is increased. However, our heuristic shows a novel
technique to link back hot and cold wallets belonging to the same user, thus allowing
to reconstruct the complete business (see Section 2.3.3). Thus, our heuristic shows
that hot-cold wallet mechanism does not increase privacy in practice.
Moreover, linking hot and cold wallets using our heuristic leads to hinder the
security supposedly provided by the hot-cold wallet mechanism. Using our heuristic,
an attacker can lucratively target the hot wallets belonging to the target business in
order to compromise their private keys and use them to issue unauthorized IOUs. This
forces the attacked business to create new hot wallets. This simple countermeasure
however does not help as the attacker can repeat the linkability process described in
this section and focus his eﬀorts to target the newly created wallet belonging to the
target business.
Additionally, our heuristic works for any IOU network following the hot-cold wallet
mechanism as described earlier. We focus on the Ripple network as it is currently
the most widely deployed credit network in practice. However, we observe that the
hot-cold wallet mechanism is also present in the Stellar network so that our heuristic
will directly apply to it when they grow to the level of Ripple network.
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2.3.3

Deanonymization of Ripple Businesses

We have presented two heuristics that enable the ﬁnding of a set of Ripple wallets
as well as cryptocurrencies wallets which are owned by a certain user. Table 2.3 shows
a summary of our ﬁndings as of December 2015, when these experiments where carried
out. This process has allowed us to cluster a total of 959 Ripple wallets, 3, 113 Bitcoin
wallets and 1, 130 altcoin wallets. Moreover, Ripple wallets clustered by our heuristics
are involved in 161, 624 XRP payments and 772, 860 settlement transactions. Our
clustered wallets were jointly involved in a bit more than 7% of the transactions in
the Ripple network.
In the rest of this section, we describe how we leveraged this clustering to
deanonymize the business of most of the main gateways. This implies that anybody accessing the publicly available Ripple data can reconstruct the total number of
transactions carried out by a gateway, and not only transactions associated to the
gateway’s public wallets, thereby having a signiﬁcant privacy breach. Remember that
the gateways and their associated transactions represent the main activity for the core
of the current Ripple network. They are used to transfer value from the real world
into Ripple and vice versa, a crucial task to create liquidity in any starting transaction
network such as Ripple or Stellar.

Table 2.3.
Number of wallets clustered in the diﬀerent heuristics. In Altcoins we
consider Litecoin, Namecoin and Terracoin. Finally, for each heuristic and
for their grouping, we show the number of Ripple transactions where either
the sender or the receiver is a clustered wallet.
Heuristic
1
2
Grouped

Wallets
435
529
959

Ripple
Transactions
96, 009
863, 614
934, 484

Bitcoin
Wallets
3, 145
–
3, 113

Altcoins
Wallets
1, 173
–
1, 130
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Single Gateway Business We ﬁrst consider the deanonymization of business
of a single gateway at a time for both DividendRippler and Bitstamp. Although
DividendRipple is currently out of business, it was one of the most active gateways for
deposits and withdrawals of cryptocurrencies at the time of the experiment. Bitstamp
continues being today one of the most active gateways over the complete Ripple
network.
In the deanonymization process of the businesses associated to DividendRippler, we
observed that DividendRippler publicly announced only one Bitcoin wallet. Extracting
the transaction history of such wallet from the Bitcoin blockchain, we observe that
more than 1, 000 bitcoins have been transacted. However, this is only a partial view
of the gateway’s business. As shown in Table 2.4, the transaction history of Bitcoin
wallets linked to the gateway by our heuristics shows that more than 5, 000 bitcoins
have been ever transacted at this gateway. These results have been possible given the
wallets linked by Heuristic 1.
At the time of these experiments, Bitstamp had only published its cold wallet and
one of its hot wallets, for which we observed that there have been 72, 042 transactions.
However, our Heuristic 2 ﬂagged another Ripple wallet as belonging to Bitstamp.
Using this extra information, it is possible to derive that Bitstamp has instead been
involved in 132, 543 transactions. Therefore, our heuristics enable the ﬁnding of
60, 501 extra transactions involving Bitstamp. During our deanonymization process,
we considered transactions where either the sender or the receiver is the linked wallet
by our heuristic.

Table 2.4.
Deanonymization of Dividendrippler Bitcoin business.
Total Sent

Total received

Total Balance

Public wallets

1062.29

1064.08

1.79

Clustered wallets

5724.38

5724.41

0.03

Number of payments
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Fig. 2.8. Comparison of the number of transactions associated to publicly known gateways’ wallets (i.e., Known payments) and transactions
performed with wallets clustered by our heuristics to those gateways (i.e.,
Heuristic payments). Dashed line groups gateways sharing an owner.

We observed that it is possible to monitor the gateway’s business even further.
Once the clustering is performed, it is possible to monitor the network to notice every
time a transaction is received by a given Ripple wallet. Using this approach it is
possible to monitor the complete set of wallets in the cluster of a given gateway, and
thereby its full activity in real time.
Several Gateways Business We have carried out the reconstruction of the business
associated to the most widely deployed gateways in the same manner we did with
Bitstamp’s business. We show the most interesting results in Figure 2.8.
We make the following observations. First, there are gateways for which the
numbers of publicly available transactions are diﬀerent. However, adding up the
transactions performed with the wallets resulting from our heuristics (Figure 2.8, red
bar), they have performed the same total amount of transactions. DividendRippler,
DYM and Chriswen constitute an example of this observation. We have veriﬁed that
indeed DividendRippler and DYM are operated by the same owner. Chriswen has
been linked due to the combined results of both heuristics presented in this work: the
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Fig. 2.9. A visualization of the deanonymization process over our clustered
graph. The sizes of the nodes correspond with the number of transactions
involving the nodes. Nodes with the same color belong to the same cluster.
Gray nodes depict wallets not deanonymized by our heuristics. Links are
colored with the color of the sending wallet.

hot wallet for Chriswen extracted from Heuristic 2 has been used in DividendRippler
and it appears in the cluster for DividendRippler and DYM resulting from Heuristic 1.
Second, there are gateways with a few transactions made by their public wallets.
However, when adding the payments associated to wallets clustered to them by our
heuristics, the number of transactions increases. This is the case, for example, for
RippleChina. Finally, we observe that no gateway (except for DividendRippler)
publishes its Bitcoin wallets. As our heuristics link Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
wallets to them, we can further deanonymize their ﬁnancial activities.
In summary, we have deanonymized 85, 962 XRP payments and 649, 640 settlement
transactions, which jointly represent the 78.7% of the total transactions we have
considered in our de-anonymization process (see Table 2.3). We have also studied
the interactions between the clusters we have obtained from our deanonymization
process, as shown in Figure 2.9. We observe that Bitstamp is the gateway with the
largest amount of transactions within our cluster. Moreover, we have deanonymized
98 Ripple wallets belonging to the gateway DividendRippler (Figure 2.9, blue nodes).
We have observed that most of these wallets were clustered to DividendRippler by
the Heuristic 1. In general, these results follow the fact that the probability that
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a Ripple wallet gets deanonymized is bigger when the wallet is clustered with our
heuristics. This is an important privacy breach: we have shown how to use it to
reproduce the business of gateways. Moreover, we contacted several gateways with
the list of Ripple wallets linked to them by our heuristic aiming at validating our
deanonymization results. We have received responses from two of them (i.e., Bitstamp
and RippleFox) and both have conﬁrmed the ownership of such wallets. Moreover,
these response do not include any wallet missed by our heuristics.

2.3.4

Deanonymization Using a Ripple Server

In the literature, there are several attacks based on maliciously including certain
nodes in a network to deanonymize other nodes in the same network. For example, in
the case of the Bitcoin network, a series of works [51,52,56] have shown that by including
a few machines in the Bitcoin network it is possible to link Bitcoin transactions to their
corresponding source IP addresses. Our results increase the privacy breach resulting
from these techniques since if a Bitcoin wallet is deanonymized, the complete cluster
(including Ripple and other cryptocurrency wallets) is deanonymized.
Ripple transactions are collected by Ripple validator servers. Similar to Bitcoin,
it is possible to further deanonymize Ripple transactions and wallets by deploying a
Ripple validator server. As of today, validator servers are run by the core Ripple team
(e.g., s-west.ripple.com) and by a few big gateway owners (e.g, SnapSwap). These
parties can leverage our heuristics to further deanonymize Ripple wallets, and users
are particularly vulnerable to deanonymization by them.
Assume we deploy one Ripple server. Then, a Ripple client can create an IP
connection to our deployed server to send us the Ripple transactions. As Ripple
transactions are sent in the clear, we can inspect them, and by looking at the Sender
ﬁeld (see Table 2.1) it is possible to associate the IP address of the incoming connection
to the Ripple wallet speciﬁed in the Sender ﬁeld.
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This privacy breach can be further exploited to link more than one Ripple wallet
to a certain IP address. In detail, assume that diﬀerent connections from the same IP
address submits n transactions tt1 , . . . , tn u, where ti has a Ripple wallet wi speciﬁed
in the Sender ﬁeld. This assumption is realistic: the currently Ripple web clients
(e.g., RippleTrade) issue all the transactions by default to the same Ripple server.
Given this scenario, it is likely that all the wi are owned by the same person and we
can further associate this cluster of wallets to the IP address used to establish the
connection with our Ripple server.
Although the possibility to employ an anonymous communication network (e.g.,
Tor [57]) to forward the transactions to the transaction collecting server has been
explored, such techniques are found to be vulnerable to denial of service and blacklisting
attacks [58].

2.4

Related Work
Since its inception, questions regarding the security and privacy of the Bitcoin

system have attracted interest from the research community. Barber et al. [46] observed
that Bitcoin exposes its users to the possible linking of their Bitcoin wallets. Thus,
recent works [47–50] have proposed simple heuristics to thwart anonymity in Bitcoin.
In a somewhat diﬀerent direction, other recent works [51, 52] show the possibility of
identifying ownership relationships between Bitcoin wallets and IP addresses. Although
it is possible to extract lessons from those works, the conceptual diﬀerences between
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and the Ripple network mandate a dedicated look.
Our novel heuristics are focused and have special interest for transaction networks
such as Ripple, including the integration of several available cryptocurrencies.
There is limited work studying the evolution, security and privacy of the Ripple
network. Di Luzio et al. [38] consider two aspects of the Ripple network. They study
the evolution of the amount and behavior of participants in the consensus protocol
used to add transactions to the ledger during the ﬁrst three years of the Ripple network.
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They also propose a novel technique to deanonymize the transactions of a given user,
leveraging side-channel information (e.g., the amount of a recent transaction performed
by the victim).
Armknecht et al. [37] present an overview of the Ripple network and give statistics
about the number of transactions, and types of transactions and exchanges. The work
is limited to the ﬁrst two years of operation of the Ripple network. The work also
demonstrates the conditions under which the Ripple consensus protocol fails, leading
to a situation where the Ripple ledger might be forked. We consider this orthogonal
to the content of this dissertation.
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3

CREDIT NETWORKS: SECURITY AND PRIVACY

After we have overviewed the Ripple network, an example of credit network deployed
in practice, and the possible security and privacy issues with the current deployment,
we are in position of building the foundations for credit networks as well as their
security and privacy notions of interest.
For starters, we envision a credit network as a combination of two main blocks:
routing and graph management. In a nutshell, routing enables to construct credit paths
between two users in the credit network; graph management allows to update the
credit network upon operations queried by the users. In particular, payment transfers
credit between a sender and a receiver through a credit path, change link updates
the credit held at a credit link, test credit calculates the available credit that can be
transferred in a payment between any two users in the credit network, and test link
provides the credit available in a credit link.
In the rest of this chapter, we ﬁrst formally deﬁne the concept of credit network
along with the aforementioned operations. We then introduce security and privacy
notions of interest in a credit network in the form of ideal functionalities. An ideal
functionality represents the expected behavior of each operation in an idealized world,
simplifying thereby its description. In subsequent chapters, we detail how to construct
a credit network that realizes this ideal functionality and thus achieves the expected
security and privacy guarantees. More details can be found in [59].
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3.1

Credit Network Deﬁnition
We denote the security parameter of our system by λ. Let polyp¨q and νp¨q be a

polynomial function and a negligible function, respectively. Let tAλ uλPN and tBλ uλPN
be two distribution ensembles indexed by λ. Then, we say that Aλ « Bλ if for all
probabilistic polynomial time algorithms A, there exists a negligible function ν such
that
|PrrApxq “ 1 | x ¨¨“ Aλ s ´ PrrApxq “ 1 | x ¨¨“ Bλ s| ď νpλq.
A credit network is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Credit network) A credit network nw :“ GpV, Eq, where V is the
set of users and E is the set of credit links, is a graph equipped with the six operations
psetup, route, pay, chgLink, test, testLinkq described below:
setupp1λ q Ñ params: On input of a security parameter, output a set of public
parameters params.
routepparamsq: On input a set of public parameters, initializes the routing information
required by each node in the credit network.
paypu1 , u2 , vq Ñ t0, 1u: On input of two user identiﬁers u1 , u2 P V and the credit
value v, if the payment is approved by u1 and if there exists enough credit ﬂow
between u1 and u2 , perform a payment from u1 to u2 of value v and return 1.
Otherwise, return 0.
chgLinkpu1 , u2 , vq Ñ t0, 1u: On input of two user identiﬁers u1 , u2 and a credit value
v, if u1 approves the operation, modify the link u1 Ñ u2 P E by v and return 1.
Otherwise, return 0.
testpu1 , u2 q Ñ v: On input of two user identiﬁers u1 , u2 , if u1 approves the operation,
return the available credit ﬂow between u1 and u2 .
testLinkpu1 , u2 q Ñ v: On input of two user identiﬁers u1 , u2 , if one of the users
approves the operation, return the credit available in the link u1 Ñ u2 .
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Correctness For a given credit network nw , let v Ð testpui , uj q. A credit network
is considered correct if the following equalities hold for all chgLink and pay operations
performed on it for any two users ui and uj .
- Let nw 1 be the network obtained after performing paypui , uj , v 1 q on nw . Then, for
the v 2 Ð testpui , uj q computed on nw 1 , v 2 “ v if the pay operation is unsuccessful,
else v 2 “ v ´ v 1 .
- Let nw 1 be the resultant network after performing chgLinkpui , uj , v 1 q on nw . Then, for
the v 2 Ð testpui , uj q computed on nw 1 , v 2 “ v if the chgLink operation is unsuccessful
(due to disapproval by ui ), else v 2 “ pv ` v 1 q.

3.2

Security and Privacy in Credit Networks
In this section, we introduce the security and privacy notions of interest in a

credit network. As a warm up, we ﬁrst introduce them informally and later we
formally describe them as ideal world functionalities. In particular, here we identify
serializability as an important system property and integrity as a fundamental security
property for a credit network. Additionally, we characterize two privacy requirements
for transactions: Value privacy and sender/receiver anonymity. In the following we
provide an intuitive description of these properties.

3.2.1

Attacker Model

We consider a decentralized network where the adversary can potentially corrupt,
spawn, or impersonate an arbitrary set of users. The adversary is allowed to adaptively
choose the set of corrupted parties. This models the fact that the adversary can include
her own users in the credit network and that the adversary might also compromise
some of the honest users’ machines. We consider only passive, but still adaptive,
corruption of a minority (less than half of the total set) of the landmark users,
which are thus assumed to be honest-but-curious. We assume that the non-corrupted
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landmarks execute the algorithms according to our speciﬁcations and do not share
private information among each other (i.e., they do not collude). In our vision,
landmarks represent the root of trust in our network and they can be seen as the
network operators (e.g., banks are the natural candidate to serve as landmarks in
a transaction system). We advocate that it is in the interest of the landmarks to
follow the protocol in order to maintain the availability of their network. That being
said, it is easy to extend our deﬁnitions to ﬁt a full corruption of the landmark users.
Furthermore, we remark that integrity guarantees, i.e., the fact that credit cannot be
stolen, must hold unconditionally in our model.

3.2.2

Goals Overview

Integrity A credit network achieves integrity if for all pairs of sender and receiver
users pu1 , u2 q P V 2 , for all values v P N, for all successful payments paypu1 , u2 , vq
and for all intermediate honest users u3 P V, such that u3 ‰ u1 and u3 ‰ u2 , the
following holds: Let u4 , u5 P V 2 be the predecessor and successor of u3 in the
payment path. Then, if there exists some credit value x P N such that u4 Ñ u3
is decreased by x, then u3 Ñ u5 is decreased by x.
Serializability Transactions in a credit network are serializable if, for all sets of pay
and chgLink operations successfully performed in a concurrent manner, there
exists a serial ordering of the same operations with the same outcome (i.e.,
changes in the credit available in the corresponding paths).
Value Privacy We say that a credit network maintains value privacy if for all pairs
of honest users pu1 , u2 q P V 2 and for all pairs of values pv, v 1 q P N2 it holds that
paypu1 , u2 , vq « paypu1 , u2 , v 1 q
to the eyes of any malicious user not involved in the transaction, as long as both
operations are either successful or fail.
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Sender/Receiver Anonymity We say that a credit network has sender anonymity
if for all pairs of honest users pu0 , u1 , u2 q P V 3 and for all values v P N we have
that, for any two simultaneous and successful payments,
paypu0 , u2 , vq « paypu1 , u2 , vq
to the eyes of any malicious intermediate user involved either in both or none of
the two transactions, such that the honest neighbors of such a corrupted node
are the same for both transactions. Receiver anonymity is deﬁned along the
same lines.

3.2.3

Formal Deﬁnitions

We formally deﬁne the security and privacy goals of decentralized credit networks
according to the Universal Composability (UC) paradigm [60]. The main idea of this
security notion is to compare a real protocol τ with some ideal world Φ, the so-called
ideal functionality. The ideal functionality can be seen as a trustworthy entity that
implements the intended behavior of the protocol. Given a real protocol τ and an
ideal protocol Φ, we say that τ UC-realises Φ if for any adversary A attacking the
protocol τ there is a simulator S performing an attack on the ideal protocol Φ such
that no environment E can distinguish between τ running with A and Φ running
with S. Here E may choose the protocol inputs and read the protocol outputs and
may communicate with the adversary or simulator (but E is, of course, not informed
whether it communicates with the adversary or the simulator). This is diﬀerent from
the traditional settings in that the environment may communicate with the adversary
during the protocol execution and that the environment does not need to choose its
inputs at the beginning of the protocol execution. Instead, it may adaptively send
inputs to the protocol parties at any time, and it may choose these inputs depending
on the outputs and the communication with the adversary. This formalization has
the advantage of modelling attacks that exploit parallel instances of the protocol and
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therefore it allows one to reason about security also in presence of parallel execution.
Due to the distributed nature of credit networks, we believe that it is of paramount
importance to capture the presence of interleaving executions also in the deﬁnition of
security. We informally deﬁne UC-Security in the following and we refer the reader to
the work of Canetti [60] for a comprehensive discussion on the matter.
Deﬁnition 2 (UC-Security) Let EXECτ,A,E be the ensemble of the outputs of the
environment E when interacting with the adversary A and parties running the protocol
τ (over the randomness of all the involved machines). A protocol τ UC-realizes an
ideal functionality Φ if for any adversary A there exists a simulator S such that
for any environment E the ensembles EXECτ,A,E and EXECΦ,S,E are computationally
indistinguishable.
We describe in the following the ideal functionality FCN , which models the intended
behavior of all the components of a credit network, in terms of functionality, security,
and privacy. We consider a connected network of n nodes where each node is labeled
either as a standard end-user (u) or as a landmark (LM). We denote by landmark a
well-connected node in the credit network. For instance, a gateway could carry out the
role of a landmark in the Ripple network whereas a bank could be the landmark in the
current network of ﬁnancial institutes. We model the synchronous network as an ideal
functionality FNET as well as the secure and authenticated channels that connect each
pair of neighboring nodes, FSMT , as proposed in [60]. In our abstraction, messages
between honest nodes are directly delivered through FSMT , i.e., the adversary cannot
identify whether there is a communication between two honest users. The attacker
can corrupt any instance by a message corrupt sent to the respective party ID. The
functionality FNET hands over to the attacker all the static information related to ID.
In case ID is a standard node, all its subsequent communication is routed through A,
which can reply arbitrarily (active corruption). If ID is a landmark, all its subsequent
communication is recorded and the transcripts are given to A (i.e., thereby modeling
passive corruption).

54

Functionality FROUT
1) LM sends to FROUT two tuples of the form pu1 , . . . , um q, indicating the sets of
neighbors of LM in the BFS trees.
2) FROUT runs a BFS algorithm over the links among registered users to construct
an arborescence and an anti-arborescence rooted at the landmark IDLM .
3) Speciﬁcally, the algorithm operates on a set of users to be visited, initially set to
the one speciﬁed by the landmark. For each user u in this set, FROUT sends her a
message psid, IDLM , h, up q via FSMT , where h is the number of hops that separates
u from IDLM and up is the parent node on that path. u can either send pK, sidq,
causing FROUT to roll back to the previous user, or pu1 , sidq to indicate the next
user u1 to visit, which is thus added to the set. The algorithm terminates when
the set is empty.

Fig. 3.1. Description of the ideal functionality for routing FROUT

Ideal Functionality Our ideal functionality for a credit network, FCN , maintains
locally the static information about nodes, credit links, and their credit using a matrix.
Additionally, FCN logs all of the changes to the credits between nodes that result from
successful transactions. FCN is composed by a set of functionalities (FROUT , FPAY ,
FTEST , FCHGLINK , FTESTLINK ) that interact as follows: FCN periodically executes a
functionality to update the routing information of the nodes in the network (FROUT )
using FNET as a mean of synchronization. Nodes can contact the ideal functionality
to perform transactions (FPAY ), test the available credit (FTEST ), update the credit
on a link (FCHGLINK ) or to test the credit available in a link (FTESTLINK ). Under these
assumptions, we describe the routines executed by FCN in the following.
FROUT

The routing algorithm as described in Figure 3.1 allows the ideal functionality

to construct multiple spanning trees (i.e., Breadth-First Search trees) in the credit
network, each spanning tree encoding transaction paths between pairs of nodes. The
landmark ﬁxes the set of children nodes for the computation of the Breadth-First
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Search (BFS) (step 1) and the ideal functionality executes the BFS (steps 2-3) by
exchanging messages with each node in the network, starting from the set speciﬁed by
the landmark. Each node can decide whether to interrupt the algorithm or to indicate
the next node to visit. This models possible disruptive users in a distributed credit
network. At the end of the execution each node learns its parent from and to the
input landmark. Two types of BFS trees are created: Arborescence tree considers
the credit links in the direction from a landmark to the users; anti-arborescence tree
considers the credit links in the direction from the users to a landmark.
FPAY

The algorithm shown in Figure 3.2 constitutes the ideal functionality of the

pay operation in a distributed credit network. The protocol is initiated by the Sdr that
communicates the two ends of the transaction to the ideal functionality FPAY (step 1).
For each landmark, FPAY derives two paths connecting the sender to the landmark
(resp. the receiver to the landmark) in a distributed fashion (step 2): the functionality
interacts with each intermediate node that can choose the next node where to route
FPAY , until the landmark is reached (or the maximum length of the path is exceeded).
Again, each node along the path can arbitrarily delay the operation and potentially
choose any next node to visit, to model possibly malicious nodes. FPAY computes then
the total amount of credit associated with each of the derived paths and sends the
information to the sender (step 3) who can either interrupt the execution or inform
FPAY of the values to transfer through each path (step 4). FPAY informs the nodes of
the value transacted through them and the receiver of the total amount of transacted
credit (steps 5-6). Each node involved in this phase can either conﬁrm or abort the
operation if the transacted amount exceeds the capacity of some link. If all of the
nodes accept, FPAY updates the credit information of each node involved consistently
with the transacted amount. Then FPAY informs the set of nodes that participated
to the protocol (starting from the receiver) of the operation’s success (step 7). This
is done again iteratively such that any node can interrupt the communication, if
traversed.
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Functionality FPAY
1) For each LM, a sender Sdr sends the tuple pSdr, Rcv, Txid, IDLM q to FPAY , where Rcv,
Txid, and IDLM denote the receiver, the transaction identiﬁer, and the landmark
identiﬁer of the transaction.
2) For each LM, FPAY derives the path from Sdr to Rcv, by concatenating the
respective paths to LM, as follows: starting from Sdr and Rcv, FPAY sends (Txid,
IDLM , u) via FSMT , where u is the previous user in the chain, if any. Each node
can either send pK, Txid, IDLM q, to have FPAY ignoring the path, or pJ, Txid, IDLM q
to let the functionality follow the path constructed by FROUT , or pu1 , Txid, IDLM q
to indicate the next user on the path to LM. FPAY proceeds until it reaches LM
from both ends (or the maximum length of the path is exceeded) and it computes
the minimum value vLM among credits of the links on the path to LM.
3) For each LM, FPAY calculates the set of tuples P “ tIDLM , vLM u, where vLM is the
credit associated to the path from the Sdr to the Rcv through LM (pathLM ). FPAY
sends then (P , Txid) to the Sdr via FSMT .
4) The Sdr can either abort by sending pK, Txidq to FPAY or send a set of tuples
pIDLM , xLM , Txidq to FPAY via FSMT .
5) For each LM, FPAY informs all the nodes in pathLM of the value xLM by sending
pxLM , IDLM , Txidq via FSMT . Each node can either send pK, IDLM , Txidq to abort
the transaction, or paccept, IDLM , Txidq to carry out the transaction. In the latter
case FPAY checks whether for the corresponding edge e : ve ě xLM , and if yes
FPAY subtracts xLM from ve . If one of the conditions is not met or there is at least
one pK, IDLM , Txidq message, then FPAY aborts the transaction and restores the
credits on the corresponding links of pathLM .
6) FPAY sends to Rcv the tuple pSdr, Rcv, v, Txidq via FSMT , where v is the total
amount transacted to Rcv. Rcv can either abort the transaction by sending
pK, Txidq or allow it by sending psuccess, Txidq.
7) For each LM, FPAY sends either psuccess, Txidq (or pK, Txidq depending on the outcome of the transaction) to each user in the path from the Rcv to the Sdr, starting
from the Rcv. Such a user can either reply with pK, Txidq to conclude the functionality or with paccept, Txidq to have FPAY passing the message psuccess, Txidq
(or pK, Txidq) to the next user until Sdr is reached.

Fig. 3.2. Description of the ideal functionality for payments FPAY
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FTEST

The test algorithm computes the credit available on the paths connecting

any two nodes in the network, and it works analogously to the steps 1-3 in FPAY .
FTESTLINK

At any point of the execution, each node can query the FTESTLINK

functionality to obtain informations about her adjacent links.
FCHGLINK

Each pair of neighboring nodes can jointly query FCHGLINK to update

their link or generate a new one.

3.2.4

Discussion

In the following we motivate our choices in the design of the ideal functionality
for a distributed credit network. First of all, we point out that in the transaction
functionality FPAY we let each node decide ‘on the ﬂy’ the next node where to route the
transaction in the path from the sender to the receiver: this captures the distributed
nature of the network where each node can route transactions arbitrarily. Nevertheless,
note that any malicious attempt to redirect the transaction would fail unless the
receiver is eventually reached, in which case the functionality of the network is not
harmed. We do not see any reason why a node should not have the capability to
switch between paths if it wishes to. It must be also pointed out that malicious
nodes cannot cause the ideal functionality to run indeﬁnitely on a path: FPAY will
ignore the path after a certain maximum length is reached and the landmark is not
an intermediate node. Another controversial point is the possibility for each node to
cause an abort of the transaction that traverses it at several points of the executions.
In this case a similar reasoning as above holds: we ﬁrst note that such an attack is
conﬁned to links that the adversary is connected to, so it would require to establish
many trust relationships with honest nodes to carry out a denial of service on a large
scale. Additionally, we believe that each node must be able to decide whether it wants
to take part to a transaction: although its total balance remains intact, some credit
is shifted from one node to another and this may be undesirable. Such a behavior
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can also easily be detected by other nodes in the network who can eventually route
subsequent transactions to other paths not traversing the faulty node.
What is left to be shown is that our ideal functionality captures the security and
privacy properties that one would expect for a credit network.
Integrity In the ideal world, integrity is guaranteed by the ideal functionality, who
maintains a database of the link values and updates them consistently with the
successful transactions.
Serializability We observe that any set of chgLink operations on the same link is
executed serially by the ideal functionality. Assume for the moment that only chgLink
operations are performed: as any two concurrent operations are necessarily executed
on two diﬀerent links, it is easy to ﬁnd a scheduler that returns the same outcome by
performing those operation in some serial order (i.e., any order). Since a pay operation
can be represented as a set of chgLink operations performed atomically (due to the
integrity notion), the property follows.
Value Privacy We observe that the only information revealed to the nodes about a
transaction is the value of the transaction that traverses them (while the total amount
of transferred credit is kept local by the ideal functionality). It is unavoidable to leak
this information to each node since it aﬀects its direct links and thus the leakage for
the transaction value in our protocol is optimal.
Sender/Receiver Anonymity For sender/receiver anonymity it is enough to observe that the ideal functionality addresses each transaction with a uniformly sampled
id that does not contain any information about the identity of the sender nor of the
receiver. Thus in the ideal world each user does not learn any information beyond the
fact that some transaction has traversed some of her direct links, which is inevitable
to disclose.

Part II
SECURE AND
PRIVACY-PRESERVING
TRANSACTION PROTOCOLS
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4

PATHSHUFFLE: ANONYMITY FOR RIPPLE TRANSACTIONS

While the Ripple network oﬀers several beneﬁts to the current ﬁnancial industry, the
public nature of its transaction ledger exposes its individual users, groups, organizations, and companies to the same severe privacy attacks as already observed in Bitcoin.
The privacy study of the Ripple network described in Section 2.3 makes this privacy
concern justiﬁable by showing that a signiﬁcant portion of Ripple transactions today
can be easily deanonymized such that everybody can determine who paid what to
whom. In this state of aﬀairs, we require a privacy solution for the currently deployed
Ripple network.
In order to ﬁll this gap, in this chapter we overview PathShuﬄe, the ﬁrst mixing
protocol for path-based transactions in credit networks that is fully compatible with
the current Ripple network. A full description can be found in [61].

4.1

Cryptographic Background and Notation
In this section, we introduce the notation that we follow in the rest of this chapter.

4.1.1

Ripple Network Operations

We use the operations available in the current Ripple network as described in Table 4.1. A transaction tx becomes valid when it is signed by the appropriate wallet’s
signing key. A transaction tx from CreateTx and ChangeLink must be signed by sk1
(i.e., the signing key of wallet vk1 ), whereas a transaction tx from CreateLink must
be signed by sk2 . Finally, a transaction tx from testLink does not require a signature.
A transaction tx is applied to the Ripple network after invoking Applyptx, σq with
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Table 4.1.
Description of the Ripple network operations.
Operation
pvk, skq ¨¨“ AccountGenp q
tx ¨¨“ CreateTxpvk1 , vk2 , vq
tx ¨¨“ CreateLinkpvk1 , vk2 , vq
tx ¨¨“ ChangeLinkpvk1 , vk2 , vq
tv, Ku ¨¨“ testLinkpvk1 , vk2 q
t0, 1u ¨¨“ Applyptx, σq

Description
Generate wallet keys
Create path-based transaction
Create link vk1 Ñ vk2 (limit v)
Modify link vk1 Ñ vk2 by v
Query IOU on link vk1 Ñ vk2
Apply signed transaction to network

the correct signature. For simplicity, with Applyptx, σq we abstract away the process
of being written to the blockchain after agreed upon consensus nodes. Moreover,
for clarity of exposition, we assume that Applyptx, σq returns immediately after tx is
applied to the Ripple network. In practice, tx is applied in a matter of seconds [36].

4.1.2

Digital Signature Scheme

A digital signature scheme allows a signer who has established a public key vk to
sign a message m using the associated secret key sk and creating thereby a signature
σ. A digital signature further allows then anyone with access to the message m,
the signature σ and the public key vk to verify that the signer correctly signed the
message m. A bit formally, a digital signature scheme Π consists of three algorithms
(KeyGen, Sign, Verify) deﬁned as follows:
KeyGenpλq Ñ sk, vk: The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and returns a pair of public key vk and secret key sk.
Signpsk, mq Ñ σ: The signing algorithm takes as input a secret key sk and a message
m and returns a signature σ.

62
Verifypvk, m, σq Ñ t0, 1u: The veriﬁcation algorithm takes as input a public key vk, a
message m and a signature σ and returns 1 if σ is a valid signature on message
m. Otherwise, it returns 0.
Security of a Digital Signature Scheme Given a ﬁxed public key vk generated
by a signer, a forgery consists of a message m˚ along with a valid signature σ ˚ , where
m˚ has not been previously signed by the signer. Now, security intuitively means that
it should be infeasible for anybody not possessing the corresponding secret key sk, to
produce a forgery. We refer the reader to [62] for a formal security deﬁnition in the
Universal Composability framework.

4.1.3

Distributed Digital Signature Scheme

In a distributed signature scheme, every user creates a fresh pair of veriﬁcation
and signing keys, publishes the veriﬁcation key, and combines the fresh veriﬁcation
keys from all users to derive the shared veriﬁcation key. Every user then uses her
fresh signing key to generate her signature (share) on a message m (e.g., a transaction
agreed among all users). The combination of all these signature shares results in a
new signature on the message m veriﬁable under the shared veriﬁcation key.
A bit more formally, a distributed digital signature scheme consists of three
protocols (SAccountCombine, SSign, Verify) deﬁned as follows:
SAccountCombinepvk1 , . . . , vkn q Ñ vks : The distributed key generation protocol takes
as input a set of veriﬁcation keys vk1 , . . . , vkn and returns the combined public
key vks .
SSignpsk1 , . . . , skn , mq Ñ σ: The distributed signing protocol takes as input a set of
signing keys sk1 , . . . , skn and returns a signature σ.
Verifypvks , m, σq Ñ t0, 1u: The veriﬁcation algorithm is deﬁned as for the digital signature scheme.
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We refer the reader to [61] for a detailed description of SAccountCombine and SSign
as well as its security discussion.

4.1.4

Shared Wallet

A wallet vks can be shared among a set of n users so that only when all users agree,
a transaction involving the shared wallet vks is performed. We use the distributed
signature scheme described in the previous section to achieve this functionality. In a bit
more detail, a shared wallet is created as follows. First, each user locally creates a fresh
Ripple wallet (vk˚i , sk˚i ), using AccountGen, that constitutes her share for the shared
wallet vks . The shared wallet can be then calculated as vks ¨¨“ SAccountCombineptvk˚i uq,
where tvk˚i u denotes the set containing one veriﬁcation key share vki˚ for each user.
Note that it is possible to construct only the veriﬁcation key of a shared wallet but
not the corresponding signing key. Instead, users can jointly create a signature σ on a
message m veriﬁable by the shared wallet’s veriﬁcation key vks . For that, the users
jointly execute σ ¨¨“ SSignptsk˚i u, mq, where tski˚ u is the set containing one signing key
share sk˚i for each user, and m is the message to be signed. This protocol returns a
signature σ. This signature can be then veriﬁed locally by every user by invoking
Verifypvks , m, σq.

4.2

Preliminaries
In this section, we ﬁrst present path mixing (Section 4.2.1), our approach to

improve anonymity in credit networks. We then describe the communication model
(Section 4.2.2), the security and privacy goals (Section 4.2.3), and the threat model
(Section 4.2.4)).
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4.2.1

Path Mixing

Assume that each user has a pair of wallets, that we denote by input and output
wallets. Furthermore, assume that users participating in the path mixing protocol
have agreed beforehand on mixing β IOU.
In this setting, a path mixing protocol aims to transfer β IOU from every input
wallet to every output wallet so that an adversary controlling the network and some
of the participating users cannot determine the pair of input and output wallets
belonging to an honest user. We denote this as a successful path mixing. Otherwise,
no IOU must be transferred from any input wallet and the path mixing is unsuccessful.
Towards achieving that, the path mixing protocol must only require functionality
already available in credit networks.

4.2.2

Setup and Communication Model

We assume that users communicate to each other through a bulletin board, e.g., a
server that receives a message from a user and broadcasts it to the rest of users. We
require that the protocol achieves anonymity even if the bulletin board is malicious
and colludes with the attacker. We thus consider the bulletin board only as an
eﬃcient mean of communication. Additionally, we assume the bounded synchronous
communication setting, where time is divided in ﬁxed epochs: Messages broadcast by
a user are available to all other users within the epoch and absence of a message from
a user in an epoch indicates that the user is oﬄine.
This bulletin board can seamlessly be deployed in practice using already deployed
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) servers with appropriate extensions (see [63] for details).
The bulletin board can be alternatively implemented by a reliable broadcast protocol [64, 65] at an increased communication cost.
We assume that users participating in the protocol have a veriﬁcation/signing key
pair (e.g., key pair for the input wallet). Moreover, we assume that each user knows
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other users’ public veriﬁcation keys and that all users have agreed on mixing a ﬁxed
amount β IOU prior to start executing the protocol.
Finally, we assume that there is a bootstrapping mechanism in place for users
to know other users willing to carry out the protocol. A malicious bootstrapping
mechanism could hinder the anonymity of an honest user by peering him with other
users under the attacker’s control. Although this is an important threat in practice,
we consider it orthogonal to our work. Note that the fees needed to carry out the
path mixing limit the number of mixings that the attacker can join.
In practice, we envision that the bulletin board enabling the communication
between users also oﬀers a service for users to register. The users could be then
grouped together to carry out the protocol following a transparent mechanism (e.g.,
based on public randomness). Nevertheless, since it is an orthogonal problem, any
bootstrapping mechanism with the desired properties could be used in our work.

4.2.3

Security and Privacy Goals

In this chapter, we consider a subset of the security and privacy goals that we
have established in Chapter 3. They are clearly a restricted version but still capture
fundamental security and privacy properties of credit networks. Moreover, they open
the possibility to have a protocol fully compatible with the current Ripple network.
Unlinkability If the path mixing protocol is successful, it should not be possible
for the attacker to determine which output wallet belongs to which honest user.
Integrity No matter whether the path mixing protocol is successful, the total credit
available to a user should not change (except for possible transaction fees).
These security and privacy goals are in tune with those presented in Chapter 3 but
with the limitations inherent to a path mixing approach. In particular, unlinkability is
a weaker privacy notion than sender/receiver privacy: The set of possible sender and
receivers for a given transaction is limited to the set of participants in one instance
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of the path mixing protocol. The integrity property remains the same as presented
in Chapter 3: As integrity deals with the total balance of honest users, a weaker notion
directly leads to unacceptable credit loss by honest users. Finally, we do not consider
serializability here as it is directly provided by the consensus protocol available in the
underlying credit network. We do not consider value privacy either as it is at odds
with an underlying public ledger that logs all the transactions and their values.

4.2.4

Threat Model

We assume that the attacker controls an arbitrary number f of users participating
in the path mixing protocol. We further assume that the attacker also controls the
bulletin board (and thus the network). The anonymity set of an honest user is the set
of all honest users. Thus, in order to achieve any meaningful anonymity guarantee,
we need that f ă n ´ 1. In other words, we do not consider the n ´ 1 attack [66] in
this work.

4.3

Solution Overview
In this section, we ﬁrst show a straw man approach for path mixing (Section 4.3.1)

to illustrate the challenges we have to overcome. Then, we overview the two building
blocks of our approach: atomic transactions in Ripple (Section 4.3.2) and the creation
of a set of wallets anonymously (Section 4.3.3).

4.3.1

A Straw Man Path Mixing Approach

Path mixing can be achieved following a straw man approach as shown in Figure 4.1.
Assume that all users participating in the path mixing trust a third-party server to
carry out the required operations on their behalf. Further assume that the server is a
gateway in the Ripple network and that there exists a path from every input wallet to
the gateway’s wallet with a capacity of at least β IOU.
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Fig. 4.1. An illustrative example of the straw man approach for path
mixing to mix 10 IOU among ﬁve users. Solid arrows depict credit links
between two wallets. Single values on edges denote the current balance
and no upper limit. Values a{b on the links denote: a current balance and
b upper limit. After ﬁnishing the straw man protocol, user A can perform
a settlement transaction for up to 10 IOU using vkout
A and vkgw as the ﬁrst
hops in the transaction path.

In this setting, ﬁrst every user can send her output wallet to the gateway using
an authenticated, private channel (e.g., TLS). An example of the protocol at this
step is shown in Figure 4.1(a). Second, every user can transfer β IOU in the Ripple
network from her input wallet to the gateway’s wallet. Finally, the gateway, working
as a mixing proxy, creates a credit link from each output wallet to the gateway’s
wallet with a credit upper limit of β IOU. In this manner, now every user can perform
a transaction for up to β IOU using the gateway’s wallet as the ﬁrst hop in the
transaction path (see Figure 4.1(b)).
For every user i, the gateway must create a credit link from the output wallet vkout
i
to its own wallet of the form vkgw Ð vkout
(i.e., vkout
owes credit to vkgw ) to ensure
i
i
unlinkability against an attacker observing the communication and the Ripple ledger.
To see that, assume for a moment that the gateway creates the credit link of the
form vkgw Ñ vkout
i . Such operation must be conﬁrmed with a signature by the user
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i (see Section 4.1.1). Now, user i must submit the signed operation to the Ripple
network. If a network attacker associates the signed message to the IP address of user
i, he directly learns that vkout
belongs to user i. As the attacker also knows the input
i
wallet belonging to user i, he trivially breaks the unlinkability property.
In this straw man approach, the server is trusted for unlinkability and integrity
properties. First, the server must be trusted not to reveal the pair of input and output
wallets belonging to a user. Second, after receiving the credit from the users’ input
wallets, the server is trusted not to steal it and instead create the credit link with the
output wallets and set up the correct credit upper limit in each credit link.
We overcome the aforementioned drawbacks by designing a decentralized path
mixing protocol, where the users jointly transfer credit from their input wallets to
their output wallets without requiring any third-party mixing proxy. For that, the
decentralized path mixing protocol must provide the two main functionalities provided
by the trusted server in the straw man approach: Atomic transactions and creating a
set of output wallets in an anonymous manner.

4.3.2

Atomic Transactions in Ripple

Assume a generic setting with a set of n input wallets tvkin
i u and a set of m output
wallets tvkout
j u. Moreover, assume that instead of a ﬁxed amount of credit β, each
input wallet must transfer βiin IOU and each output wallet must receive βjout IOU.
Although the sets of input and output wallets might not be of the same size (i.e., n
might not be equal to m), naturally the IOU to be transferred must be equal to the
ř
ř
IOU to be received (i.e., i βiin “ j βjout ). In such setting, PathShuﬄe, our novel
protocol to enforce atomic transactions fully compatible with Ripple, must ensure that
ř
either all the i βiin IOU are transferred from input to output wallets or no IOU is
transferred.
Using a Shared Wallet It is possible to create a wallet shared among the users
such that only when all users agree, a transaction involving the shared wallet is
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Fig. 4.2. An illustrative example of an atomic transaction. The input
in
in
in
in
wallets vkin
A , vkB , vkC , vkD and vkE transfer 20, 10, 30, 15 and 5 IOU
out
correspondingly. The output wallets vkout
Y and vkZ receive 55 and 25 IOU,
respectively. Solid arrows depict credit links between two wallets. Single
values on edges denote the current balance and no upper limit. Values a{b
on the links denote: a current balance and b upper limit. After a successful
execution of PathShuﬄe, it is possible to perform a settlement transaction
out
from the output wallets (e.g., from vkout
Y for up to 55 IOU using vks , and
vkgw as the ﬁrst hops in the transaction path).
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performed. This eﬀectively allows to add one synchronization round: Each user i ﬁrst
ř
transfers βiin IOU to a shared wallet and only when i βiin IOU are collected, they
are sent to the output wallets. This, however, does not solve the fairness problem
either. Once all the IOU are collected in the shared wallet, a (malicious) user could
collaborate with the rest to create and sign a transaction to one of the output wallets
and then disconnect. In this manner, the IOU to be transferred to the rest of output
wallets are locked in the shared wallet.
Solution: Two Shared Wallets The idea underlying our approach for an atomic
transaction is to use two synchronization rounds via two shared wallets (say vkin
s and
vkout
s ).
in
in
An example is depicted in Figure 4.2: Five users with input wallets tvkin
A , vkB , vkC ,
in
out
vkin
D , vkE u would like to transfer t20, 10, 30, 15, 5u IOU into two output wallets tvkY ,

vkout
Z u. These two output wallets must receive t55, 25u IOU. To achieve that, in the
in
ﬁrst round users jointly create a credit link from each input wallet (vkin
i ) to vks with
β in ris

IOU on them. Moreover, users jointly create a credit link from each of the output

out
wallets (vkout
with no IOU on them but an upper limit of βjout . At this point,
j ) to vks

cannot be issued as part of a settlement transaction because vkout
credit at each vkout
j
s
does not have incoming credit yet (see Figure 4.2(a)). The second synchronization
round can be then used to overcome that. All users jointly create a transaction from
ř
gets enough credit that can be
vksin to vksout for a value of i βiin IOU. Then, vkout
s
used by each of the output wallets vkout
(see Figure 4.2(b)).
j

4.3.3

Creating the Set of Output Wallets Anonymously

The possibility of performing atomic transactions on its own does not provide a
complete path-mixing solution. Assume an atomic transaction from n input wallets to
n output wallets, where each wallet transfers a ﬁxed amount of IOU β. Even then, a
naive path mixing where each user publishes her output wallet in a manner that can
be linked to her identity, clearly violates unlinkability in the presence of a network
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attacker. In order to overcome this challenge, users need to jointly come up with a set
of their output wallets such that the owner of a given output wallet is not leaked to
the rest of users.

4.4

Protocol Details
In this section, we describe the details of PathShuﬄe, our novel protocol for atomic,

anonymous transactions in credit networks (Section 4.4.1). Additionally, we describe
possible extensions and applications (Section 4.4.2). We analyze the security and
privacy guarantees of PathShuﬄe (Section 4.4.3). Finally, we evaluate the performance
of PathShuﬄe (Section 4.4.4).

4.4.1

Protocol Description

The PathShuﬄe protocol works as described below. We ﬁrst describe our assumptions and then we detail each phase of the protocol. We depict a sample execution for
PathShuﬄe in Figure 4.3. Finally, a detailed pseudocode for the protocol is presented
in Algorithm 1.
Assumptions We assume that the users have agreed on β, the amount of IOU (in
some currency) to be mixed in the path mixing (i.e., @i βiin “ β). We further assume
that the users have agreed on a common wallet (i.e., vkgw ) and that each user has
a credit link vkin
i Ð vkgw with at least β IOU. Moreover, we assume that there is
only one IOU currency (e.g., USD) over the credit links in the Ripple network, as
otherwise unlinkability can be trivially broken: Input and output wallets using a
distinct currency belong to the same user.
In multiple steps of the protocol, each user will submit to the Ripple network a
copy of the same correctly signed transaction. This does not have negative security
implications: The transaction is only applied once to the Ripple network since every
transaction contains a sequence number to avoid replay attacks.
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Algorithm 1 PathShuﬄe protocol.
in
pskin
i , vki q:

Input :

out
pskout
i , vki q:

β, sid:
vkgw :

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:
36:
37:
38:
39:

User i input wallet’s keys
User i output wallet’s keys
Agreed amount of IOU to mix and session identiﬁer
Agreed gateway wallet

{Exchange output wallets anonymously}
out
¨
tvkout
Πpiq u ¨“ Shuﬄeptvki uq
{Create shares for shared wallets and broadcast them}
for i P t1, . . . , nu do
˚in ¨
pvk˚in
i , ski q ¨“ AccountGenpq
˚out
pvki , ski˚out q ¨¨“ AccountGenpq
˚out
broadcast pvk˚in
, Signpskiin , pvki˚in , vki˚out , sidqqq
i , vki
end for
{Create shared wallets }
˚in
¨
vkin
s ¨“ SAccountCombineptvki uq
out ¨
vks ¨“ SAccountCombineptvk˚out
uq
i
in
{Create credit links vkin
Ñ
vk
and
fund them}
i
s
for i P t1, . . . , nu do
in
in
LINKiin ¨¨“ CreateLinkpvki , vks , 8q
in
˚in
in
σi ¨¨“ SSignptski u, LINKi q
in
ApplypLINKin
i , σi q
1 in
in
in
LINKi ¨¨“ ChangeLinkpvki , vks , βq
1 in
1 in
in
σi ¨¨“ Signpski , LINKi q
1
1
ApplypLINKiin , σiin q
end for
{Verify credit link vkin
i Ñ for every user }
for i P t1, . . . , nu do
in
v ¨¨“ testLinkpvkin
i , vks q
if v “ K _ v ă β then abort end if
end for
{Create credit links vkout
Ñ vksout }
i
for i P t1, . . . , nu do
out
out
LINKiout ¨¨“ CreateLinkpvki , vks , βq
out
˚out
out
σi ¨¨“ SSignptski u, LINKi q
out
ApplypLINKout
i , σi q
end for
{Create credit link vkgw Ñ vkout
s }
out
LINKgw ¨¨“ CreateLinkpvkgw , vks , 8q
σgw ¨¨“ SSignptski˚out u, LINKgw q
ApplypLINKgw , σgw q
{Final settlement transaction}
out
tx ¨¨“ CreateTxpvkin
s , vks , β ¨ nq
σtx ¨¨“ SSignptski˚in u, txq
Applyptx, σtx q
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Phase 0: Exchange Output Wallets Anonymously Several P2P mixing protocols proposed in the literature implement a permutation that ensures that output
messages (i.e., wallets in this case) cannot be linked to their owners, as required in
our decentralized path mixing protocol. Among them, we decide to use DiceMix [63]
due to its eﬃciency, but in principle we could have used any P2P mixing protocol.
Given that PathShuﬄe is parametric to the P2P mixing protocol, we omit its details
here and refer the reader to [63] for a detailed description. In the rest, we denote a
P2P mixing protocol by Shuﬄe.
Phase 1: Create and Connect Input Shared Wallet The users jointly create
a shared input wallet, that we denote by vkin
s . We require that only transactions
starting at vkin
s can be performed. For that, the rippling option (see Section 2.2) must
be disabled at each credit link with vkin
s wallet.
in
Then, users jointly create a credit link from each input wallet vkin
i to vks . Such

credit links are then signed by all users using their signing key shares for the input
shared wallet. If a user generates a wrong partial signature, the honest users consider
her to be malicious. Otherwise, these credit links along with their signatures are
submitted to the Ripple network.
Additionally, each user i locally creates and signs a transaction that issues βiin
in
credit to the recently created link vkin
i Ñ vks . Such signature is then broadcast to

every other user in the protocol, what allows them to apply the funding transactions
in the Ripple network. If some user refuses to fund such a credit link, the honest users
consider her to be malicious.
Phase 2: Create and Connect Output Shared Wallet The shared output
wallet vkout
is created in the same manner as the shared input wallet vkin
s . However,
s
transactions that use vkout
as intermediate hop must be allowed in this case and for
s
that, the rippling option must be enabled for the credit links of vkout
s . Then, for each
output wallet j, users jointly create a credit link from each vkout
to vksout with an
j
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upper limit of βjout . Moreover, the users jointly create a link vkgw Ñ vkout
with no IOU
s
on it. These links will later allow to transfer up to βjout IOU from the wallet vkout
j .
The details of creating the links and verifying the corresponding signatures are
similar to the previous case involving the input shared wallet. As before, users ensure
that only links from known output wallets are created. If during this phase some user
generates an invalid signature, the honest users consider her to be malicious.
wallet does not have any
Phase 3: Final Transaction At this point, the vkout
s
incoming credit and thus no transaction from an output wallet through vkout
can be
s
performed yet. To solve this situation, the users jointly create a settlement transaction
ř
out
transferring j βjout IOU from vkin
s to vks . This settlement transaction is possible
using the n available paths through each of the users’ input wallets. If some user does
not sign such transaction, the honest users consider her to be malicious.
out
Interestingly, this settlement transaction makes credit to ﬂow from vkin
so
s to vks
ř
that the credit link between vkgw and vkout
has now j βjout IOU. This fact enables
s

now settlement transactions from each output wallet to the rest of the credit network.

4.4.2

Extensions and Applications

Other Credit Networks We have focused the description of PathShuﬄe to the
Ripple network since it is currently the most widely deployed credit network. Nevertheless, the same protocol can be used to achieve atomic transactions in other credit
networks provided that they oﬀer all the functionality required by PathShuﬄe. For
instance, PathShuﬄe can be also deployed in the Stellar network. The Stellar network
provides functionality to create links, set their upper limit and perform path-based
transactions [67]. Moreover, Stellar implements a mechanism to enable and disable the
rippling option as in Ripple [68]. Finally, Stellar supports the same digital signature
schemes as Ripple and thus shared wallets can also be implemented in Stellar.
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Crowdfunding Application We use atomic transactions as a building block to
achieve anonymous transactions. Nevertheless, we note that atomic transactions
become of interest on its own for other scenarios. For example, they can enable a
crowdfunding transaction in a credit network. Interestingly, the example depicted
in Figure 4.2 is indeed a crowdfunding transaction where the ﬁve input wallets are used
to fund the two output wallets. PathShuﬄe ensures that either every user participating
in the crowdfunding transfers the expected amount of IOU into the crowdfunding
and vkout
wallets (e.g., vkout
Y
Z ) or none of the users transfers any IOU.

4.4.3

Security and Privacy Analysis

In this section, we argue why PathShuﬄe achieves the security and privacy goals of
interest. We refer the reader to [61] for a more detailed security and privacy analysis.
Correctness The ﬁnal transaction ensures that exactly β are transferred through
the input wallet of the user i (i.e., vkin
i ). Moreover, the upper limit on the links from
each output wallet to vkout
ensures that wallet vkjout has only access to vkjout IOU. This
s
demonstrates the correctness of PathShuﬄe.
Atomicity A path mixing protocol is atomic if either β IOU are transferred from
input wallets to output wallets or no IOU is transferred.
In the following, we argue that PathShuﬄe achieves atomicity. In order to see
that, we make the following observations. First, the creation and set up of the shared
wallets do not involve the credit to be transferred. Second, the deactivation of rippling
in
option on vkin
s credit links ensures that only settlement transactions starting at vks are

accepted by the Ripple network. This prevents a malicious user from stealing honest
user’s credit using vkin
s as intermediate wallet, e.g., by means of a settlement transaction
with path: vkmalicious – vkin
s – vkhonest – vkgw – vkmalicious . (Circular transactions are
accepted and used in the Ripple network. For example, a transaction of the form vki –
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vkgw1 – . . . – vkgw2 – vki , where . . . denotes an arbitrary set of wallets, can be used by
user i to exchange IOU from gateway 1 to gateway 2.)
out
Third, the settlement transaction from vkin
sends all the credit at once.
s to vks

Thus, either all users contribute the expected credit for the transaction or none of
them do. Moreover, this transaction is created and submitted to the Ripple network
only if there is a link from each output wallet to vkout
with the expected credit upper
s
limit. In this manner, it is ensured that credit in the output wallets can be used later
to perform a transaction to any other wallet in the credit network.
out
Note that the settlement transaction from vkin
is the last step of the
s to vks

protocol. Thus, whenever the current run of the protocol is disrupted by a malicious
user, the credit on the links between the tvkin
i u and vkgw is not used and can be reused
in
in another invocation of PathShuﬄe. Finally, the links between tvkin
i u and vks might

stay funded after disruption is detected. However, this credit is created only for the
purpose of running the protocol and it does not have value outside of it.
Unlinkability PathShuﬄe relies on a secure P2P mixing protocol to construct the
list of output wallets and this building block ensures that the output wallets are
published without leaking the relation between a single output wallet and its owner.
Moreover, a look at the pseudocode for the rest of the PathShuﬄe protocol shows
that operations on PathShuﬄe are totally independent on who is the owner of each
output wallet: Each input wallet transfers β IOU and each output wallet receives β
IOU. Therefore, PathShuﬄe does not leak the owner of any output wallet. This shows
that PathShuﬄe achieves unlinkability.
Integrity The underlying P2P mixing protocol does not perform any operation
involving the credit of the users. Moreover, the underlying P2P mixing protocol
ensures for each user that the rest of the P2P mixing protocol is only called if the list
of output wallets contains her own output wallet. Thus if the PathShuﬄe succeeds,
the same amount β of IOU that is taken from her input wallet is transferred to her
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output wallet. If PathShuﬄe fails, no IOU is transferred at all. This shows that
PathShuﬄe achieves integrity.

4.4.4

Performance Analysis

In PathShuﬄe, we use the DiceMix protocol as deﬁned in the original paper [63]
as the underlying P2P mixing protocol. Thus, in this section we restrict our analysis
to the additional operations required by PathShuﬄe and the performance analysis for
the core of DiceMix described in [63] carries over in our work.
Implementation We have implemented PathShuﬄe in JavaScript by modifying
the current Ripple code [69]. In particular, we have implemented the shared wallet
management by modifying the elliptic library, an implementation of the EdDSA digital
signature scheme supported in Ripple. Moreover, we have used the API provided by
the ripple-lib library [70] to implement the submission of transactions to the Ripple
network. Our source code is publicly available [71] under the MIT license.
Implementation-level Optimizations For readability, we have speciﬁed Algorithm 1 in sequential steps. However, several of these steps can be carried out in
parallel, improving thereby the overall performance of the PathShuﬄe protocol. First,
out
both shared wallets vkin
can be created in parallel. Second, the creation
s and vks
out
of links between vkin
and
s and input wallets and the creation of links between vks

output wallets are independent operations and can be fully parallelized. Thus, it
is possible to perform a single SSignp. . . q invocation to jointly sign the create link
transactions for all of these links.
Additional optimizations are possible to reduce the number of communication
rounds. In particular, the SSignp. . . q procedure requires two broadcast rounds (see Section 4.1.3): One round to broadcast the randomness chosen by each user, and a second
round to broadcast the signature share from each user. As the randomness is chosen
independently of the message to be signed, this broadcast can be integrated with a
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previous communication round in the protocol. In this manner, a call to SSignp. . . q
costs only one extra communication round.
Communication Overhead A protocol based on DiceMix needs pc ` 3q ` pc ` 1qf
communications rounds, where c is number of communication rounds required by
Conﬁrmp. . . q and f is the number of disrupting users.
In our case c “ 2, so PathShuﬄe needs 5`3f communication rounds. As mentioned
out
and randomness for
above, broadcast of random elements (e.g., shares for vkin
s and vks

each of the invocations of SSignp. . . q) can be carried out before PathShuﬄe is invoked.
Then, one communication round is required for each of the two times SSignp. . . q is
in
out
invoked: First to jointly sign the creation of the links vkin
i Ñ vks , vkgw Ñ vks , and

vkout
Ñ vksout ; and second to jointly sign the ﬁnal transaction that transfers IOU from
j
out
vkin
s to vks . Note that, as the credit links created in PathShuﬄe are deterministically

deﬁned from the input of the protocol, the signatures on the funding transactions for
the links

VKin ris

Ñ vkin
s can be broadcast the ﬁrst time SSignp. . . q is invoked.

Computation Overhead In this evaluation, we measure the computation time
required by each user on a computer with an Intel i7, 3.1 GHz processor and 16
GB RAM. Given the aforementioned implementation-level optimizations, we have
studied the running time for a single run of SAccountCombinep. . .q and SSignp. . .q
algorithms. This thus simulates the creation of a single shared wallet and the signature
of a transaction involving a shared wallet. We have observed that even with 50
participants, SAccountCombinep. . .q takes 537 ˘ 66.8 milliseconds and SSignp. . .q takes
45 ˘ 3.57 milliseconds using our unoptimized implementation. It is important to note
that it takes approximately 5 seconds for a transaction to be applied into the current
Ripple network [36]. Thus, the overall running time of PathShuﬄe even considering
the computation time required for DiceMix is mandated by the time necessary for the
Apply operations at each communication round of PathShuﬄe.
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Running Time We observe that each communication round in the conﬁrmation
algorithm requires to submit (possibly several parallel) transactions to the Ripple
network. It takes approximately 5 seconds for a transaction to be applied to the
current Ripple network. Therefore, we expect that this mandates the time per
communication round. Altogether, we expect the protocol to run in under 20 s with
a reasonable number of 50 non-disruptive users: Conﬁrmation takes 2 ¨ 5 s and the
required functionality from DiceMix needs about 8 s to complete [63].
Scalability The time to execute DiceMix is dominated by its communication cost,
as it requires each user to send n ¨ |m| bits, where n is the number of users and
|m| is the number of bits of the mixed message (e.g., a Ripple wallet in our case).
Nevertheless, it has been shown that DiceMix can scale up to a moderate number of
users (e.g., 50 users) [63].
In PathShuﬄe, the execution time is dominated by the Applyp. . .q operations.
Although PathShuﬄe requires a number of credit links linear in the number of users,
their corresponding operations can be parallelized so that only 5 seconds are needed per
synchronization round. Overall, given the synchronization required for the broadcasts
in DiceMix and the interaction with the Ripple network in PathShuﬄe, we expect
that PathShuﬄe provides anonymity guarantees to moderate size groups of users.
Compatibility We have simulated a run of PathShuﬄe without disruption in the
currently deployed Ripple network. In particular, we have successfully recreated the
scenario depicted in Figure 4.3. As a proof-of-concept, users are simulated by our
JavaScript implementation in a single machine. The mixed IOU are denominated in
PSH, a user-deﬁned currency created for the purpose of this experiment. We describe
the details in the original paper [61].
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4.5

Anonymity Protocols for Bitcoin
In the realm of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, several solutions have been

proposed to achieve anonymous payments [46,63,72–84]. These solutions are tailored to
the speciﬁcs of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. Given the fundamental diﬀerences
between credit networks and cryptocurrencies, it remains an interesting future work to
study whether it is feasible to adapt the underlying ideas of these solutions to credit
networks.
For example, it is conceivable that simple centralized mixing protocols such as
Mixcoin [75] and Blindcoin [77], which do not rely on smart contracts, can be adapted
to Ripple with non-trivial modiﬁcations. In these solutions, the mixing server can
steal coins from the users, although such theft is accountable. In this work, instead,
we instead strive for a solution where no theft is possible in the ﬁrst place. All existing
theft-resistant mixing protocols for cryptocurrencies either rely on multi-input-multioutput transactions or on script-based smart contracts, none of which are supported in
credit networks such as Ripple. Therefore, none of the privacy-enhancing technologies
proposed for cryptocurrencies are directly applicable to path-based transactions in
the Ripple network.
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5

DECENTRALIZED CREDIT NETWORKS

As we described in Section 2.3, the Ripple ledger maintains a log of every credit link
between the wallets in the credit network and all the transactions settled between the
wallets, what becomes the key source of several privacy issues. In this state of aﬀairs,
the following question naturally arises: Is it possible to build a credit network without
a ledger?
We observe that the net credit balance of a user in a credit network (i.e., diﬀerence
between the credit that the user is owed and the credit the user owes to others) is
fully determined by her own credit links. Therefore, a user can ensure that she does
not incur in credit loss solely checking that her net balance does not change without
her being a sender or receiver of a transaction.
The illustrative example depicted in Figure 5.1 shows the net balances for each
user before and after the transaction from Fabi to Bob for a credit value of 8 IOU
(with no fees for clarity of explanation). Although inﬂow and outﬂow values change
for all transaction participants, intermediate users Carol and Edward maintain their
net balance intact. The net balance only changes for the sender Fabi (it is reduced by
8 IOU) and the receiver Bob (it is increased by 8 IOU).
We build upon the aforementioned observation to create a decentralized credit
network where users locally store their own credit links. In the example depicted
in Figure 5.1, Alice locally stores the credit value on her link with Carol. Similarly,
Carol locally stores the credit on her links with Alice, Bob and Edward. The rest of
users locally store their credit links in a similar manner.
In such setting, where a complete ledger is no longer available, several challenges
arise. How to calculate the path between sender and receiver of a transaction? How
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Fig. 5.1. Illustrative example of net balance conservation. Fanny performs
a settlement transaction with Bob for a credit value of 8 IOU. Although
inﬂow and outﬂow change, net balance is maintained for intermediate users
(e.g., Carol and Edison). Values crossed in red denoted stale values due to
the settlement transaction.

to calculate the credit available between two users to perform a transaction? How to
perform a transaction involving several users? And ﬁnally, how to carry out all the
previous operations while preserving privacy?
We answer these questions in SilentWhispers [59], an architecture to enforce
security and privacy in decentralized credit networks. In such settings, a transaction
is jointly executed by all the users involved in such transaction, who contribute their
locally stored credit links in a privacy-preserving manner. In this manner, assuming
that participating users are online, SilentWhispers ensures that privacy properties of
interest, such as transaction value privacy, sender and receiver privacy as well as link
privacy, are preserved.
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5.1

Cryptographic Background and Notation
We start with an intuitive description of the cryptographic primitives that we have

deployed in SilentWhispers. We describe here only the additional primitives that were
not shown in Section 4.1.

5.1.1

Secret Sharing

A secret sharing scheme [85] allows a dealer to distribute shares of a secret among
diﬀerent parties such that any arbitrary subset of shares above the threshold allows a
receiver to fully reconstruct the secret. We refer to such a sharing mechanism as a
pt, N q-threshold secret sharing scheme. A bit more formally, a secret sharing scheme
T consists of two algorithms (Share, Reconstruct) deﬁned as follows:
Sharepsq Ñ rrs1 , . . . , sN ss: The share creation algorithm takes as input the secret s and
returns a set of N shares rrs1 , . . . , sN ss.
Reconstructprrs1 , . . . , st ssq Ñ s: The secret reconstruction algorithm takes as input t
shares of a secret s and returns the secret s itself.
Security of a Secret Sharing Scheme Given a ﬁxed number of parties N , it
should be infeasible for anybody in possession of any subset of less than t shares of a
secret s, to reconstruct the secret s itself.

5.1.2

Distributed Minimum Computation

A secret sharing scheme as presented above can be leveraged to perform multiparty
computations. In a multiparty computation protocol, each user i has an input xi and
a function to be computed f pq. The goal of a multiparty computation protocol is to
let a set of N users to compute y :“ f px1 , . . . , xN q without them learning anything
about the input from any other user other than what is trivially revealed by y.
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In SilentWhispers, we require a multiparty computation where the function f
is deﬁned as the minimum among all the input values. On input secret shares of
values x1 , . . . , xn shared using scheme T among a set of computing parties, we use a
multi-party computation protocol minpq that results in each party having a share of the
minimum of those values. We employ a distributed integer comparison protocol [86]
for this distributed computation.

5.1.3

Notation for Protocol Description

We use the following termonology to describe our protocols.
ppu, iq Parent of node u in the pathi
cpu, iq Child of node u in the pathi
vu1 ,u2

Credit value on link u1 Ñ u2

stu1 ,u2

Last value on u1 Ñ u2 agreed by u1 , u2

mris
vkiu
max
ts

5.2

Element at position i in array m
Fresh veriﬁcation key of user u in pathi
Maximum path length (system parameter)
Current timestamp

Preliminaries
In this section, we describe how to adapt the Ripple Network to ﬁt our description

of credit network. Moreover, we review the setup and communication model. Here, we
consider the threat model as described in Chapter 3 and aim to achieve the security
and privacy goals described in Chapter 3.
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5.2.1

Adapting the Ripple Network

In this chapter, we consider a credit network as described in Chapter 3. In
particular, for ease of exposition, we consider a transformation of the credit network
to denote how much IOU can be transferred between wallets instead of how much IOU
one wallet owes to its counterparty, as described by Dandekar et al. [87]. For example,
a credit link of the form u1 Ñ u2 with balance α and limit β, is now represented as
two credit links: one credit link u1 Ñ u2 with weight β ´ α, and a second link u1 Ð u2
with weight α.
In this alternative way of representing the credit network, a payment operation
works slightly diﬀerent. A payment for a value v requires to reduce v in each credit
link from the sender to the receiver and to increase v in each link from the receiver to
the sender. One advantage of this representation is to calculate the credit available in
a path: It simply consists on calculating the minimum weight in the credit links from
the sender to the receiver.

5.2.2

Setup and Communication Model

Throughout this chapter, we assume that the set of landmarks is ﬁxed at the
beginning of each epoch and that it is known to all users. Any changes to the set
become eﬀective in the next epoch. This is crucial as this allows users to know the
root of all Breadth-First Search trees in advance (and therefore the number of possible
paths) during the routing operation, and to securely communicate with them. In
practice, one can maintain the set of landmarks in a public and authenticated log
(e.g., as Tor directory authorities listing).
We assume that the communication between two honest users is not observable by
the attacker. This is a stronger requirement than the presence of a secure channel,
since, in addition to hiding the messages exchanged by the two clients, we want
to hide the fact that communication happened in the ﬁrst place. If the adversary
observes whether two honest users communicate, it is not possible to enforce any
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meaningful notion of sender/receiver privacy. We note that, in practice, this condition
can be enforced by having the two users deploying some anonymous communication
channel (e.g., Tor [57]). Moreover, we require all of the involved users to be online
during a given transaction for the execution of the algorithms. We discuss later in the
extensions of SilentWhispers how to relax this condition.

5.3

Solution Overview
As a warm up, we propose a naı̈ve solution to build a secure, privacy-preserving

decentralized credit network and discuss its ﬂows. We then overview our approach
towards our constructions in SilentWhispers. We divide our exposition in the two main
functionality blocks that compose a credit network: Routing and graph management.

5.3.1

Routing

A common, prominent challenge in a credit network is to determine credit routes
between the senderand the receiver. Ghosh et al. [1] have shown that the problem of
maximizing the possible transactions (which they term as social welfare) in a credit
network is NP-hard. Existing credit networks instead consider one transaction at a
time and employ the maximum ﬂow approach [88] to check the available credit among
all possible paths between sender and receiver. However, the most eﬃcient known
max-ﬂow algorithms run in OpV 3 q [89] or OpV 2 logpEqq [90] time. For this reason,
recent work explored the possibility to eﬃciently calculate only a subset of all possible
paths between senderand receiver, thereby underestimating the available credit. The
idea of this algorithm, called landmark routing [91], is to calculate a path between
senderand receiverthrough an intermediary node called a landmark. As demonstrated
by Viswanath et al. in the Canal credit network [92], landmark routing performs much
better in large networks than the max-ﬂow approach, with an accuracy loss of only
5%. Canal is split into two processes:
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1. Universe creator: This process has access to the plain network graph along
with all links’ weights. It randomly selects a small subset of nodes denoted
as landmarks. For every landmark, it calculates the shortest path from the
landmark to every other node in the graph using a breadth-ﬁrst search (BFS)
algorithm, resulting in a BFS tree. The resulting set of BFS trees is stored in
the so-called landmark universe.
2. Path stitcher: For a request to pay β credits from a sendernode to a receivernode, the path stitcher reads the landmark universe looking for paths with
available credit between senderand receiver. When the process ﬁnds a set of
paths with a total of at least β available credits, it carries out the transaction
by decreasing the credit of the corresponding links and returning a successful
result. If the process instead reaches the end of the landmark universe without
success, the graph is kept unchanged and it returns an unsuccessful result.
Routing information must be repeatedly recalculated to account for the dynamic
nature of credit networks: credit links among users are continuously updated, created,
and deleted as a result of carrying out the transactions. Under the assumption
that users are loosely synchronized, we divide the time in well-known epochs: BFS
arborescences and anti-arborescences are created at the beginning of each epoch and
users utilize that routing information throughout the duration of the epoch.
We assume that the set of landmarks is ﬁxed and known to all users and that
the credit network is a connected graph. Then, the correctness of BFS ascertains
that each user receives routing information from all her neighbors for each landmark.
This ensures that no honest user is alienated by a malicious neighbor; the absence of
BFS related communication from a neighbor for any landmark serves as a detection
mechanism of misbehavior so that further actions (e.g., removing the link with the
misbehaving neighbor) can be adopted.
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5.3.2

Graph Management

The central technical challenge in the design of a credit network is the computation
of the credit available in a certain path, which is necessary for performing a transaction.
A ﬁrst, trivial solution would be to let every user in the path privately communicate
her own link’s value to the corresponding landmark so that the landmark can thereby
compute the minimum value over the path and notify the intended recipients. It
is easy to see, however, that this approach fails to guarantee privacy against an
honest-but-curious landmark as the landmark would learn the credit associated with
each link.
A local approach, where the credit on the path gets computed step-by-step by each
user in the path, does not solve the privacy problem either. For instance, suppose
that each user sends to the next user in the path the lower value between the one of
its own link and the one received from the previous user: It is easy to see that such a
protocol leaks all the intermediate values.
The idea underlying our approach is to design a secure Multi-Party Computation
(SMPC) protocol to compute the credit available on a path. In order to boost the
eﬃciency of our construction, we let landmarks play the role of computation parties,
each receiving a share of the credit on each link from the sender to the receiver.
Landmarks can jointly compute the credit on the whole path, intuitively by computing
a series of minimum functions, but without learning anything about the result of the
computation, nor of course the credit on the links.
An illustrative example is shown in Figure 5.2. First, every user in the payment
path from the sender (Alice) to the receiver (Dave), creates a share of the link’s value
for each of the landmarks. After receiving all shares, landmarks locally compute the
“minimum” function over the shares, thereby obtaining a share of the result that is
then sent to the sender. Finally, the sender reconstructs the result and carries out the
payment.
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Fig. 5.2. An illustrative example of the use of SMPC in SilentWhispers:
Dashed lines show communication between parties and solid arrows represent credit links, while notation ras indicates a (secret sharing) share of
value a. We consider a payment from Alice to Dave. First, every user in
the path sends a share of her link value to each landmark. Then, landmarks
locally compute the share of the minimum credit on the path and send it
to the sender. Transfer of the share from the landmark in the middle to
the sender has been omitted for readability.

This approach, however, leaves two important concerns unanswered. First, how to
assure that the shares come from users forming a path from the sender to the receiver
without compromising their privacy (e.g., revealing the links); and second, how to
enforce the correctness of the updates of links caused by the transaction without using
a public ledger.
We ensure that all shares come from users in a path from the sender to the receiver
by resorting to a chain of signatures. Naı̈vely, we could assume that every user uses a
long-term key pair to sign the veriﬁcation key from her predecessor and her successor
in a given path. This would result in a unique signature chain serving as a valid proof
of the existence of a path from sender to receiver.
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Fig. 5.3. Illustrative example of path construction in SilentWhispers. Every
user i has a pair (sk˚i , vk˚i ) of signing and veriﬁcation keys. Every user in
the path privately exchanges the fresh veriﬁcation key to both neighbors.
Then, each user publishes a signed tuple containing the fresh veriﬁcation
keys of the neighbors and his/her own. A path is correct if contiguous
veriﬁcation keys in the path are equal.

However, the exposure of the same long term keys across diﬀerent transactions
would allow for correlation attacks and ultimately compromise user privacy. Using
fresh keys per transaction to overcome this issue does not entirely solve the problem
either: since fresh keys are not bound to a user, an adversary can always impersonate
an honest user with her own keys.
Our idea, instead, is to combine long term and fresh keys. First, a user signs a
fresh veriﬁcation key with her long term signing key so that they are bound together.
The (sensitive) long term veriﬁcation key is revealed only to the counterparty in a
credit link so that the relation between a fresh veriﬁcation key and a user is veriﬁable
to the counterparty but remains hidden for the rest of users in the credit network.
Second, a user can use her fresh signing key to sign the fresh veriﬁcation key of the
predecessor and successor in any given path, thereby creating a signature chain. A
pictorial description of the approach is reported in Figure 5.3.

92
5.4

Protocol Speciﬁcations
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the SilentWhispers protocol and then discuss on

possible extensions to cope with oﬄine users or malicious landmarks among others
aspects. Finally, we analyze the security, privacy and performance of our proposed
protocol.

5.4.1

Protocol Description

In the following we describe the routines of SilentWhispers.
Routing Users have access to a synchronous network through FNET . Every pair of
users sharing a credit link communicate through a secure and authenticated channel,
described by FSMT . Secure realizations of FNET and FSMT have been proposed in [60].
Finally, users have access to the routing protocol described in FROUT : this functionality
is executed periodically at epochs (e.g., according to some system parameter) so that
frequent changes in the inherently dynamic topology of credit networks are taken into
account for subsequent transactions.
Setup Link The credit link updates are handled as deﬁned in the link setup protocol (Algorithm 2). This protocol allows two users sharing a credit link to agree on the
link’s value at the beginning of each routing epoch. This is later used as a reference for
subsequent updates within the epoch. For that, each user signs the other’s long-term
veriﬁcation key and the current credit with her own long-term signing key.
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Algorithm 2 Link setup protocol.
u1 , u 2 :
Input :

v:
psk˚ui , vk˚ui q:
epoch:

Nodes creating a shared link
Value of the link u1 Ñ u2
User i long term keys
Current epoch

1: u1 sends σ1 ¨¨“ Signpsk1˚ , psettled||vk˚1 ||vk˚2 ||v||epochqq to u2
2: u2 sends σ2 ¨¨“ Signpsk2˚ , psettled||vk˚1 ||vk˚2 ||v||epochqq to u1
3: if
Verifypvk˚2 , psettled||vk˚1 ||vk˚2 ||v||epochq, σ2 q then u1
4:

pσ1 , σ2 , stvk˚1 ,vk˚2 :“ psettled||vk1˚ ||vk˚2 ||v||epochqq
if Verifypvk˚1 , psettled||vk˚1 ||vk˚2 ||v||epochq, σ1 q
pσ1 , σ2 , stvk˚1 ,vk˚2 :“ psettled||vk1˚ ||vk2˚ ||v||epochqq

then

u2

stores
stores

Payment For easing the presentation, we have made two simpliﬁcations. First,
we assume the set of paths tpath1 , . . . , pathLM u as input of the transaction protocol,
although in reality every user notiﬁes her parent on the path that she is part of a
transaction path and she needs to carry out the corresponding operations. Second,
at certain steps of the protocol we write that users submit messages directly to the
corresponding landmark (e.g., line 10) to mean that such messages are sent to the
landmark by forwarding it among neighbors in the path. The creator of such message
encrypts it under the public key of the landmark and signs it with her fresh signing
key to avoid tampering from other users.
Phase 1: path construction and shares submission (lines 1-15): In this phase, users
on each path create a signature chain and submit the shares of their link values to the
landmarks. In detail, starting from the sender, each user signs her fresh veriﬁcation
key with her long term signing key and sends the signature to both the successor and
the predecessor in the path (lines 3-4). This signature binds a fresh veriﬁcation key to
a user and thus avoids illegitimate impersonations. Neighbors can then exchange the
shares of their shared link’s value and check that they reconstruct to the same value
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(i.e., the two end-points agree on the credit between them) (lines 5-6). Finally, each
user on the path signs all this information along with a timestamp (to avoid replay
attacks) and sends it to the landmarks (lines 8-10). The signature is created with the
user’s fresh signing key so that the user’s identity is concealed from the landmarks.
Finally, the sender must create additional messages for each path in order to pad it
into a length predeﬁned by the system (i.e., max) in order to avoid inference attacks
based on the path length (line 14). The same procedure is symmetrically carried out
on the paths from the receiver to each landmark.
Concerning the integrity of paths, we observe that a malicious user could divert the
signature chain using fresh keys of her choice. However, she cannot get an honest user
into the fake chain continuation, since that user would refuse to sign the attacker’s
fresh key, making the attack ineﬀective.
Phase 2: computation of credit on a path (lines 16-24): In this phase, landmarks
verify the correctness of the signature chain and calculate the credit available in each
path. In particular, after the landmarks receive messages from up to max users for
each path, they verify that neighboring keys in a path are consistent and calculate
the minimum value of each path using a secure multi-party computation (lines 17-24).
This results into each landmark having a share of the minimum value for each path
which is then sent to the sender.
In a nutshell, the use of fresh keys hides users identities and the multiparty
computation over shared values does not reveal the actual link values to the landmarks.
Additionally, due to the use of fresh keys for each path, landmarks cannot detect
whether a given link is shared in more than one path. This could result in landmarks
calculating a path value greater than the available one. Nevertheless, this overapproximation is detected in the next phase when a link cannot be updated due to
insuﬃcient credit and this path is then ignored for the transaction without incurring
any credit loss for the users involved in the transaction.
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Algorithm 3 Transaction protocol.
Sdr, Rcv:
Input:

tpath1 , . . . , pathLM u
psk˚ui , vk˚ui q:

Transaction sender and receiver
Set of paths Sdr to Rcv
user ui long term keys

1: {Phase 1: signature chain }
2: for i P |LM| do
3:
for u P pathi do
4:
u creates fresh keys psku , vku q, σu :“ Signpsk˚u , vku q and sends pσu , vku q to
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:

ppu, iq and to cpu, iq
u receives pσcpu,iq , vkcpu,iq q from cpu, iq and pσppu,iq , vkppu,iq q from ppu, iq
u receives from cpu, iq shares rrs11 , . . . , s1|LM| ss , u reconstructs v’ from
rrs11 , . . . , s1|LM| ss and checks whether v 1 “ vcpu,iq,u
u creates rrs1 , . . . , s|LM| ss for the value vu,ppu,iq and sends them to ppu, iq
if Verifypvk˚cpu,iq , vkcpu,iq , σcpu,iq q ^ Verifypvk˚ppu,iq , vkppu,iq , σppu,iq q then
for j P |LM| do
u creates m :“ pvkcpu,iq ||rrs1j ss||vku ||vkppu,iq ||rrsj ss||Txid||tsq, u creates
σLMj ¨¨“ Signpsku , mq and ﬁnally sends pσLMj , mq to LMj
end for
end if
end for
Sdr creates k :“ pmax ´ |pathi |q more tuples pm, σLMi q , where all shares
reconstruct to the maximum possible credit in a link, and sends them to LMi
end for
{Phase 2: Minimum computation}
for i P |LM| do
Each LM checks whether |pathi | “ max ^
for all j P t1, . . . , |pathi |u do
Verifypmj r3s, mj , σj q ^ mj r1s “ mj´1 r3s ^ mj r4s “ mj`1 r3s ^ mj´1 r6s “
mj r6s “ mj`1 r6s
end for
Each LM computes the share smini as result for function minp¨q over the
shares rrs1 , . . . , smax ss belonging to pathi .
Each LM sends the resulting tuples pi, smini , vki1 , vkimax q to Sdr
end for
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Algorithm 4 Transaction protocol (continued)
1: {Phase 3: Carrying out transaction}
2: Sdr reconstructs the tuples pi, mini q and veriﬁes that vki1 and vkimax are the ﬁrst

and last keys of pathi as she expects
3: for i P |LM| do
4:
Sdr chooses

5:
6:

7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:

the transaction value xi ,
generates txi
:“
i
i
pts||xi ||Txid||vkSdr ||vkRcv q and σSdr :“ SignpskSdr , txi q, and sends (txi , σSdr ) to
the nodes in pathi
for u P pathi do
u checks VerifypvkSdr , txi , σiSdr q, xi is smaller than the value vu,ppu,iq , and
previous link cpu, iq Ñ u has been reduced by xi u decreases link value on
pathi by xi resulting in x1i
u creates m :“ pon hold||vk˚u ||vk˚ppu,iq ||x1i ||txi q, σu :“ Signpsk˚u , mq and sends
pσu , mq to ppu, iq
u receives σppu,iq :“ Signpsk˚ppu,iq , mq from ppu, iq
u and ppu, iq locally store pstvk˚u ,vk˚
:“ mq and (σppu,iq , σu q
ppu,iq
end for
i
i q to Sdr
Rcv σRcv
:“ SignpskRcv , txi q and sends ptxi , σRcv
end for
for i P |LM| do
i , σ i q to every node in path
Rcv sends ptxi , σSdr
i
Rcv
for u P pathi do
u creates m :“ psettled||vk˚u ||vk˚cpu,iq ||x1i ||tsq, σu :“ Signpsk˚u , mq and sends
pσu , mq to cpu, iq
u receives σcpu,iq :“ Signpsk˚cpu,iq , mq from cpu, iq
u and cpu, iq locally store pstvk˚u ,vk˚ :“ mq and pσcpu,iq , σu q
cpu,iq
end for
end for

Phase 3: Updating link values (lines 1-20, continuation): Link values on each
path are updated so that the expected credit reaches the receiver. This process is
performed in two steps. First, the transaction value for each path is decreased (i.e.,
on hold) on each link from the sender to the receiver (lines 3-10, continuation). This
ensures that a user puts on hold credit on her outgoing link only after assuring the
credit in the incoming link has been held, and thus a honest user in the path cannot
incur in credit loss. This escrow serves as a commitment to accept the new link value
if the receiver eventually accepts the transaction.
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Second, after receiving the conﬁrmation from the receiver (i.e., the receiver signature
on the transaction’s value for a given path), the held value is adopted as the new
credit value (i.e., settled) on each link, starting from the receiver to the sender (lines
13-20, continuation). This reverse order ensures that each user in the path has an
incentive to settle the ﬁnal value: a user ﬁrst settles the outgoing link (i.e., giving
out credit), and thus is in the user interest to settle the incoming link (i.e., receiving
credit) to recover the credit. In this manner, credit values on transaction paths can be
consistently updated. Interestingly, if any user does not cooperate with her neighbor
during this phase (e.g., a faulty user), the credit involved in the dispute is bounded
and eventually would be resolved by either continuing the execution or aborting the
payment in the complete path.
Test Credit The test operation works similar to the transaction protocol. It only
diﬀers in the fact that the sender will not carry out the transaction, as the test
operation only requires the sender to learn the available credit.
Test Link and Change Link The testLink and chgLink can be easily performed
by exchanging a message between the two end-points of the credit link through their
authenticated private channel.

5.4.2

Security and Privacy Analysis

We hereby state the security and privacy results for SilentWhispers. We prove
our result in the FNET , FSMT -hybrid model; i.e., the theorem holds for any UC-secure
realization of FNET and FSMT .
Theorem 5.4.1 (UC-Security) Let T be a secure secret sharing scheme and Π be
an existentially unforgeable digital signature scheme, then SilentWhispers UC-realizes
the ideal functionality FCN in the FNET , FSMT -hybrid model.
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Proof [Sketch] The proof proceeds by describing the simulator S that interacts
with the ideal functionality FCN in the ideal world and must provide to a corrupted
environment E inputs that are computationally indistinguishable to the ones that A
would output in the real-wold protocol. Thus the core of the proof is the simulation of
the inputs that A is expecting from the protocol while interacting in the ideal world.
We identify two main technical highlights in the proof: (i) any honestly computed
signature in the protocol is simulated via the simulator oﬀered by the security deﬁnition
of digital signatures and (ii) shares of unknown secrets are simulated with values
sampled uniformly at random from the appropriate domain. In the former case the
indistinguishability from an honest execution is provided directly by the security
deﬁnition of the signature scheme, while in the latter case it follows by the information
theoretic hiding of the shared secret (throughout the experiment we always simulate a
number of shares below the threshold value). The rest of the simulation focuses on
adapting the adversarial behavior to the ideal functionality, aborting when appropriate.

The full proof is elaborated in the full version of the paper [59].

5.4.3

Performance Analysis

We have developed a C++ implementation to demonstrate the feasibility of
SilentWhispers. We focus in particular on the payment protocol (Protocol 3), which
dominates by far the computational complexity, simulating the main functionality of
both landmarks and users in the credit network. Our realization relies on the MPC
Shared Library [93], on the Shamir’s information theoretic construction [85] for secret
sharing, and on Schnorr’s signatures [94, 95] due to their eﬃciency.
Implementation-Level Optimizations There exist several independent operations in a transaction that can be parallelized. Intuitively, in the ﬁrst phase, users can
prepare fresh keys, signatures and shares of the link values for each path in parallel.
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They can then be processed and veriﬁed by landmarks in parallel as well during the
second phase of the transaction protocol. Finally, users can carry out the third phase
by updating links for diﬀerent paths independently of each other.
Since the min function is associative, we can parallelize independent min operations
to improve the eﬃciency of calculating the minimum value in a path. For instance,
x :“ minpa, bq and y :“ minpc, dq can be done in parallel and then compute minpx, yq
to obtain the minimum among a, b, c, d. Finally, the sender can reconstruct the mini
values for each pathi and transmit it to the users in pathi in parallel.
Performance We conduct our experiments in machines with 3.3 GHz processor and
8 GB RAM to carry out decentralized operations involving landmarks (e.g., multiparty
computation of the minimum value of a path). We simulate each landmark in a
diﬀerent machine. For our experiments, we have implemented the cryptographic
schemes used in the transaction protocol. Based on their execution time, we calculated
the total time for the transaction operations taking into account the implementation
optimizations.
Transaction Time The chgLink and testLink operations are performed directly
between the users sharing a credit link and are extremely eﬃcient. Among the other
transactions, we have studied the pay transaction, since it is clearly more expensive than
test. In particular, we ﬁrst study the communication cost and then the computation
time required for the pay operation.
In the pay operation, each user in the path must forward messages to the neighbors.
The longest message to be sent as deﬁned in Algorithm 3 contains 340 bytes: 4
veriﬁcations keys (i.e., 64 bytes each in the elliptic curve setting), 5 integers of 4 bytes
each and a signature (i.e., extra 64 bytes). In the worst case, a user must forward
one such messages for each of the max neighbors and thus the communication cost is
max ¨ 340 bytes. In practice, max is a small constant and forwarding such message
can be done eﬃciently even with commodity communication links.

100

Table 5.1.
Times in seconds to compute Min(a, b). We use 32 bits to represent a and
b. In a setup (n, t), n denotes the total number of landmarks out of which
t are compromised.
Setup

p5, 1q

p5, 2q

p7, 1q

p7, 2q

p7, 3q

Time

0.304

0.314

0.357

0.346

0.349

Regarding computation time, we observe that operations performed by users
in phases 1 and 3 consist of the creation and veriﬁcation of signatures, which are
extremely eﬃcient. Therefore, we focus on the computation of the credit value of a
path (i.e., the minimum among the credit values of the links composing the path),
since it is the most expensive operation.
The time to compute the minimum between two values among a set of landmarks
is shown in Table 5.1. The actual number of such min computations required to
calculate the credit in a path depends on the length of the path (i.e., max). Using
the implementation level optimizations, landmarks need to perform only rlogpmaxqs
min operations sequentially. In Table 5.2 we show the time to compute the credit in
a path for diﬀerent path lengths. In particular, computing the minimum credit in a
path takes roughly 1.7 seconds for max “ 20.
Routing Time We consider the remaining protocols in SilentWhispers: the link
setup and the routing protocol. The link setup is extremely eﬃcient and can be
done even oﬄine. The routing protocol requires a decentralized BFS algorithm. The
decentralized BFS is well studied in the literature and it has been shown to be
practical [96]. In particular, the proposed algorithm has a communication complexity
of OpEq and a time complexity of Opl2 q, where E denotes the number of links and l
denotes the height of the BFS tree. Moreover, BFS does not involve cryptographic
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Table 5.2.
Times in seconds to compute the credit on a path. We use a setup (7, 3):
7 landmarks, 3 compromised.
Path Length (max)

5

10

20

Time

1.047

1.349

1.745

operations and it can be run as a background process, thus it does not hinder the
performance of the rest of system operations.
Establishing System Parameters Running SilentWhispers requires setting up
two system parameters: the maximum path length and the number of landmarks.
To do that, we have extracted transactions carried out in Ripple [37]. Based on this
information, we set up the system parameters such that SilentWhispers can process
the transactions already performed in Ripple.
First, for processing a transaction, the sender has to pad the number of links in
the path to maintain the privacy properties. In order to ﬁnd a meaningful value for
the maximum path length, we have collected all transactions from the start of the
Ripple network until December 2015, resulting in a set of 17,645,343 transactions.
The maximum path length that we have observed is 10 links. Thus, we set up the
maximum path length to 10 in our evaluation.
Second, processing a transaction requires more than one path. The actual number
of paths used in a transaction will determine the number of landmarks required in our
system. In order to ﬁnd this value, we have extracted the distribution on the number
of paths that have been used for the Ripple transactions. We have observed that the
maximum number of paths used in a transaction is 7 and thus we use 7 landmarks in
our evaluation. We note that using the landmark routing algorithm in the current
Ripple network might imply a variation in the number of required landmarks. However,
choosing adequate users as landmarks will ensure that the maximum number of paths
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is maintained within a small factor, as most of the transactions are routed through
the landmarks.
In practice, selecting those users with higher number of credit links as the landmarks
facilitates ﬁnding suitable transaction paths between users for a transaction. For
instance, banks are the natural candidate to serve as landmarks in a transaction
network. Furthermore, we have extracted the Ripple network and observed that most
nodes have links to a few highly connected nodes, which correspond to gateways. They
are already well known to all users as most of them also contribute to validate the
Ripple network, and they thus become the ideal landmark candidates when applying
SilentWhispers in Ripple.
In conclusion, SilentWhispers can simulate the Ripple network using 7 landmarks
and a path length of 10. Given these system parameters, each user has to forward,
in the worst case, a message of 10 ¨ 340 “ 3400 bytes, which can be done eﬃciently
even with commodity communication links. Moreover, computing the minimum credit
in a path takes roughly 1.3 seconds (see Table 5.2). A transaction in the currently
deployed transaction network Ripple, takes approximately 5 seconds. Thus, our
evaluation shows that SilentWhispers does not introduce any signiﬁcant overhead to
the transaction time.
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6

SUMMARY

In this dissertation we thoroughly study the security and privacy in credit networks
and we expect that it motivates the use of secure and privacy-preserving transaction
protocols in the current and emerging systems based on credit networks. In particular,
this dissertation describes the following contributions.
Security and Privacy Study of the Ripple Network As the most representative
instance of credit network in practice, we have thoroughly studied the Ripple network
to characterize its security and privacy issues. As a result, we describe the eﬀect of
unexpected redistribution of credit, the eﬀect of faulty gateways and the eﬀect of
stale oﬀers on the credit held by users. Our results show that the Ripple community
must be educated about these issues to prevent them from credit losses. Moreover,
we shed light on the gap –due to certain patterns of use and interaction between
parties in the network— between the (supposedly) provided privacy available in the
Ripple network and the actual privacy achieved by the current Ripple users and, most
importantly, their transactions. Our analysis thus motivates the imperative need for
better privacy-preserving transactions mechanisms for Ripple and any other emerging
transaction network based on the same design principles.
Security and Privacy Deﬁnitions for Credit Networks The lack of formal
deﬁnitions of security and privacy notions of interest in a credit network hinders the
design of systems aiming to provide secure and privacy-preserving transactions. In
this state of aﬀairs, we provide the ﬁrst formalization for the notions of integrity,
transaction value privacy and transaction sender/receiver privacy. These deﬁnitions
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serve as the basis to formally assess the security and privacy guarantees achieved by
new proposals of credit network systems.
Anonymous Transactions in Ripple Currently deployed credit networks such
as Ripple rely on a public available ledger that inherently leaks sensitive ﬁnancial
information such as credit links and transactions. Given that, we require a solution that
provides anonymous transactions fully compatible with the current Ripple network.
In order to achieve that, we have built PathShuﬄe, our novel protocol to perform
atomic and anonymous transactions in the Ripple network. The atomicity provided
by PathShuﬄe is of special interest not only for path mixing protocols, but also for
other applications such as crowdfunding.
Secure and Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Credit Networks Tailored
privacy-enhancing protocols such as PathShuﬄe help to raise the bar, but do not
provide a generic solution with strong privacy guarantees. In this dissertation we
have presented SilentWhispers, a novel decentralized architecture for credit networks
that achieves strong security and privacy properties. The distinguishing feature of our
architecture is the avoidance of a global, publicly available ledger and still provides
the functionality required by users in a credit network.
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